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Abstract
This research seeks to inform on the relationship between tactics and attrition
during the 1864 campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley. Many studies have broadly
examined these campaigns but have not focused their analysis on the relationship
between tactics and attrition. By doing this it allows this examination to gain a deeper
understanding of how particular engagements were decided, and ultimately the fate of the
Shenandoah Valley. This research utilizes a chronological approach and relies on
numerous primary sources from officers that provide an accurate appraisal of troop
strengths and tactics employed. Various sources such as letters, diaries, and
correspondence have been used to support these findings. Official reports have also
proven to be quite useful as they provide thorough and comprehensive information on the
progression of many engagements. Memoirs and post war manuscripts also provide
valuable insight into the role of attrition and the relationship with tactics. This study
demonstrates how attrition and tactics were closely related. It exposes that tactics often
dictated how extensive attrition would be in a given engagement. Additionally it
demonstrates how attrition, or the prospect of it, would dictate to the commanders what
tactics could be used. It is also evident that the army that best marshaled their resources
to mitigate or accentuate numerical disparities would be most successful. The field
would benefit from an incorporation of this type of analysis, as it would provide a clearer
explanation of how individual battles were decided. This type of analysis distills the
sometimes overly complex nuances of many works and provides a clear and concise
appraisal of how battles were decided.

iv

Introduction
Early autumn in the Shenandoah Valley was a serene period full of vibrant
transformations in foliage and a welcome change from the oppressive heat. The pastures
and fields around Belle Grove Plantation presented a picturesque scene that one would
hardly associate with a battlefield. The rising sun beamed golden rays across the peak of
Massanutten Mountain, which summoned an orchestra of singing birds. Suddenly, a
series of deep rolling booms echoed throughout the placid Shenandoah Valley. If it were
any other day, these resonations could have been mistaken for an early morning
thunderstorm. However, this day was quite the exception to the norm; the thunderous
disturbance was the deep thud of Federal artillery as it frantically attempted to thwart a
Confederate surprise attack. As the battle raged, the fate of the Shenandoah would be
determined and by the evening of October 19, 1864, the Confederate army there had been
shattered, never again to roam the Valley.
This scene did not come to fruition independently, but was the culmination of a
complex and dynamic campaign that spanned several months while covering multiple
states. In order to understand the profound implications of that fateful October day in the
Shenandoah, it is essential to conduct an analysis of the events and battles leading up to
it. While external factors such as population size and economics tangentially factored
into this campaign, it would be impractical to include them in this type of analysis.
However, for the sake of this appraisal it is necessary to analyze the events that directly
related to the campaign and what important factors contributed to its outcome.
As with most military related subjects, there exists a myriad of different
approaches by which a topic of this nature can be analyzed. The 1864 campaigns in the
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Shenandoah are no exception to this overarching trend. Much of the existing research on
the subject examines topics such as how the campaigns related in a larger context to the
war itself or provide an evaluation of key personalities. This research, however, intends
to address two critical factors that influenced the outcome of numerous battles during the
1864 campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley. This examination will focus primarily on the
relationship between battlefield tactics and numerical disparities as a result of attrition,
and how these two variables altered the outcome of numerous clashes during the period.
Traditionally the term attrition has been used in a broad sense to describe the gradual
reduction in usable resources for combat and the support of an army. These could
include a broad number of variables such as lack of food, clothing, ammunition,
casualties, or a general loss of support for the war effort. This research, however, utilizes
a much narrower definition of attrition. This analysis defines attrition as occasions when
troops are forced away from combat roles for the following reasons. Firstly, the most
prevalent cause of attrition was injuries and deaths sustained during battle and ancillary
operations. However, men being detailed to care for wounded or being deterred from
actively participating in actual fighting and maneuvering for any other reason is also
recognized as attrition in this analysis. This narrower definition of attrition is adopted for
the purposes of this analysis because it allows for an isolation of the actual battles
themselves rather than including an array of other variables such as morale and national
will which would be beyond the scope of this research and deserve their own individual
treatments. This examination does acknowledge the importance of economic shortfalls in
the Confederate war effort and how they tangentially affected the outcomes of
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engagements, but it is not the primary emphasis of this analysis. Much of the existing
literature on the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign only occasionally addresses the
relationship between attrition and tactics. Many of the works primarily examine the
campaign on a broader scale, but fail to focus their analysis on this specific range of
parameters. To this end, the following research seeks to fill a gap in the field and provide
a fresh analysis on these influential events.
This research employs a chronological approach, which is helpful in charting the
progression of tactics and attrition in various campaigns. It will perform an examination
of the relationship between attrition and tactics on major battles in all three campaigns in
order to analyze developing trends and similarities. In order to perform this appraisal the
following research will utilize resources that provide insight into tactics and decisions
relating to the outcomes of battles. Official reports, diaries, and memoirs of high level
officers are all useful in gaining accurate information about attrition levels and various
tactical maneuvers.1
1

For a broad overview of the American Civil War reference Louis P. Masur, The Civil War: A Concise
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). To gain a better understanding of the political arena
during and prior to the conflict look at Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in
the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). For an analysis on what led to eventual
Confederate defeat examine Gary Gallagher, The Confederate War: How Popular Will, Nationalism, and
Military Strategy Could Not Stave Off Defeat (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). Gallagher’s
assertions in this text are recognized as an important set of arguments regarding Confederate loss. This
work articulates that decisions on the battlefield and mistakes in the military arena were primary
contributors to eventual Confederate defeat. Gallagher’s work responds to assertions in Richard Beringer,
Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1986). Their important examination argues another common position held by
historians in the field on Confederate capitulation. They claim that dwindling support and lack of morale,
not defeat in the military arena, were primary factors in Confederate defeat. For a better understanding of
the relationship between attrition and tactics, reference Gary W. Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley
Campaign of 1864 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006). For more information on
the opening phases of the Lynchburg Campaign reference Richard R. Duncan, Lee's Endangered Left: The
Civil War in Western Virginia, Spring of 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998). To
gain a better understanding of Early’s campaign toward Washington D.C. look at Scott C. Patchan,
Shenandoah Summer: The 1864 Valley Campaign. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007) along
with Steven Bernstein, The Confederacy’s Last Northern Offensive (New York: McFarland, 2010). When
researching Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign consult Jeffry D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar
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Jeffery Wert’s text From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign
of 1864 provides a well-rounded appraisal of the campaign that covers an array of
subjects. While this study does address attrition and, at times, its relationship to tactics it
is not the primary focus of Wert’s analysis. However, Wert does an excellent job of
narrating the sequence of battles and providing valuable information on the many
personalities involved in General Phil Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Wert’s
broad analysis spans only the months when Sheridan was present in the Valley and leaves
out significant segments leading up to Sheridan’s arrival.2
Gary Gallagher’s The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 is another important
series of arguments on the subject that cover a myriad of topics, not all of which examine
attrition and its influence on tactics. This study is useful in gaining an understanding of
varying perspectives but, like Wert’s analysis, falls short in its scope. This assemblage of
articles narrows their evaluation primarily to Sheridan’s exploits in the Shenandoah
Valley but provides little review on the two campaigns prior. This research, unlike that
of previous mentioned texts, will include the two campaigns leading up to Sheridan’s
appearance in the Shenandoah in order to provide a more comprehensive examination of
the topic.3

Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987). This
appraisal is a useful and comprehensive analysis of the campaign and provides a valuable examination of
the campaign’s chronology. For a comprehensive examination of the last major engagement in the
Shenandoah consult Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Library, 1992) along with Jonathan A. Noyalas, The Battle of Cedar Creek: Victory From the
Jaws of Defeat (Charleston: The History Press, 2009).
2

Jeffry D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 3-13.
3

Gary W. Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2006) x-xxi
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On a broader scale, this research seeks to parallel and expand upon some of the
ideas presented in Gary Gallagher’s The Confederate War: How Popular Will,
Nationalism, and Military Strategy Could Not Stave Off Defeat. This text covers a
variety of subjects but asserts that Confederate failure was not necessarily the result of a
waning support for the war. He also debunks some of the myths that the Confederacy
never truly had a chance of victory due to economic and industrial weaknesses. The crux
of Gallagher’s assertions is that the Confederacy ultimately failed to achieve victory in
the military theatre by simply not winning enough critical battles. This segment of
Gallagher’s work inspired this research to expand upon the role of tactics and attrition
and how they facilitated the outcomes of various battles.4
Prior to the American Civil War, the United States had gradually divided between
two distinctly different economies. The South became known for its slave-based
agricultural economy that relied heavily on the production of cash crops and exported
goods. The North enjoyed many fast-moving waterways, which were ideal for the
construction of mills, but it lacked the climate to produce major cash crops. Over time,
the North developed an economic system that was initially anchored in agriculture but
moved into a range of industrial endeavors. The South’s need to maintain high levels of
crop production spurred its inhabitants to rely progressively more on slave labor.5 By the
late 1850s, moral and ethical qualms regarding the institution of slavery became
increasingly popular topics in the media and the chambers of Congress. By 1860, the
failure of representatives from both sides resulted in the secession of South Carolina from
4

5

Gallagher, The Confederate War, Page 3-13.

Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave
South (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), Page 17-45
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the Union. By April 1861, Virginia had followed the lead of neighboring states and
joined the newly formed Confederate States of America.6
The South’s decision to place the Confederate capitol in Richmond had profound
implications for the entire state and specifically, the Shenandoah Valley. Richmond
naturally became an important strategic target for the Union, and Federal commanders,
along with President Abraham Lincoln, almost immediately initiated plans to capture the
city. Richmond’s position so close to the Union meant that it required a constant military
presence to defend it. The Shenandoah Valley subsequently became an ancillary target
for the Union war effort as it represented a route into central Virginia where a Federal
expeditionary force could disrupt Confederate internal lines that supplied Richmond.7 To
this extent, the Shenandoah Valley was a prime corridor that could facilitate an invasion
into central or southern Virginia. Furthermore, this region could also be utilized by the
Confederacy as an invasion route into the Union
The Shenandoah Valley possessed added value as a military target because of its
resources and economic contributions to the Confederate war effort. The Valley enjoyed
the benefit of a meandering river that coursed through the region, which dramatically
aided agricultural endeavors. The many streams throughout the region that feed the river
were also utilized for mills and the river itself was harnessed to transport goods to
market. These resources spurred the Confederacy to protect the region and subsequently
made the Shenandoah an even greater target for the Union. In his memoirs, Grant stated,
“Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal
6

Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), Page 11-38
7

Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, Page 34-47
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storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known
that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.”8
By 1862, a Union army had been dispatched to capture Richmond from the south
via the waterways adjacent to the Chesapeake Bay. To mitigate the Federal troop
strength around Richmond, General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson was dispatched to
the Shenandoah Valley to create a new front of sorts that would warrant a realignment of
Union resources to quell the new Confederate offensive. In this sense, Jackson’s 1862
campaign utilized the Shenandoah Valley in a diversionary capacity to alleviate pressure
around the Confederate capitol. During this campaign, Jackson repeatedly defeated or
thwarted Federal attempts to crush his severely outnumbered force and succeeded in
drawing troops away from the effort to capture Richmond. The success of Jackson’s
campaign made the Shenandoah Valley internationally famous and created a precedent in
the minds of Confederate strategists that the Valley could be utilized for similar purposes
in the future.9
Jackson’s campaign was not the only major Confederate military operation in the
region that garnered the attention of the Union. In 1863, Robert E. Lee sought to gain a
decisive victory north of the Mason-Dixon and damper, if not extinguish, Union support
for the war. In order to do this, Lee needed to amass segments of his Army of Northern
Virginia somewhere near his intended route north. Lee recognized the Shenandoah
Valley as an ideal staging area where he could prepare elements of his force for an

8

Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant (Washington: Create Space
Independent Publishing), 528
9

Gary Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press,
2003), 4-43
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invasion of Pennsylvania. Here, Lee used the Valley to launch one of the most iconic
campaigns of the war when he journeyed north and suffered a devastating defeat at
Gettysburg.10 Lee’s northern expedition shocked the Union and was cause for concern
amongst politicians and military strategists alike. In an effort to prevent further
Confederate incursions, the Union sought to eliminate the Shenandoah Valley as a viable
staging point by which southern raids could strike targets in the Union. In this sense, the
Gettysburg Campaign indirectly resulted in a greater focus on the Shenandoah Valley.11

10

Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3-July 13,
1863 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010), 7-18
11

Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, Page 48, 224-225
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Chapter 1: The Lynchburg Campaign
By 1864, Ulysses S. Grant took supreme command of Union armies operating in
Virginia and throughout the South. Grant hoped to fix and destroy the Army of Northern
Virginia by forcing it to defend the approaches to Richmond. As a supporting effort, he
dispatched Major General Franz Sigel to march south through the Shenandoah Valley and
assault the Confederate depot at Lynchburg.12 It was Grant’s hope that the destruction of
this railroad hub would severely inhibit or disrupt Confederate attempts to defend
Richmond, as it would prevent the movement of men and material to the city.13
Franz Sigel had previously been in command of the Department of West Virginia
and had approximately 10,000 men at his disposal at the onset of this expedition. Upon
hearing of Sigel’s movement, Confederate Major General John C. Breckinridge
desperately began to marshal all available men and resources to repel Sigel’s advancing
army.14 Breckinridge called upon John D. Imboden’s cavalry brigade to support his two
infantry brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Gabriel C. Wharton and John C.
Echols. In addition, the Confederate commander was able to muster approximately 250
cadets from the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington to bolster his meager force.15
Both Breckinridge and Sigel began jockeying for position as the Federals raced down the
Valley Pike. Breckinridge, realizing his numerical deficiencies, sought to buy himself
12

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter: Papers of the Military Historical Society of
Massachusetts. Volume VI. The Shenandoah Campaigns of 1862 and 1864 and the Appomattox Campaign
1865 (Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1907), 62-64

13

William C. Davis, The Battle of New Market (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1983), 46-68

14

Edward H. Phillips, The Lower Shenandoah Valley in the Civil War (Lynchburg: H.E. Howard, 1993)
156
15

Charles R. Knight, Valley Thunder: The Battle of New Market and the Opening of the Shenandoah Valley
Campaign, May 1864 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010), 23-45
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time and directed John Imboden’s cavalry to slow and disrupt Sigel’s progression south.
The decision to dispatch Imboden’s cavalry to stall the Federals represents a superb
tactical decision given the Confederate numerical inadequacies. By stalling Sigel,
Breckinridge afforded himself enough time to muster the independent commands
operating in the area and push his troop strength up to approximately 4,000 men.16
Imboden’s harassing tactics worked impeccably and forced Sigel to dispatch
elements of his cavalry reserves to address the Confederate disruption. In addition to
buying Breckinridge crucial time to organize his force, Imboden’s actions sapped Sigel’s
troop strength.17 By May 15, Imboden’s cavalry had rejoined Breckinridge’s main force
approximately 10 miles south of the small town of New Market, which was situated
along the Valley Pike and was surrounded by a series of rolling hills.18 Approximately a
half-mile west of New Market is the North Fork of the Shenandoah River, which severely
constrained the movements on the battlefield and the potential routes for a flanking
maneuver.19 Nonetheless, Breckinridge hoped to engage Sigel’s force before they
marched any further south and the Confederates raced down the Valley to meet the
oncoming Federals.
Sigel’s army had just reached New Market when they began to make contact with
elements of Breckinridge’s diminutive army. By 10:00 A.M. on May 15, heavy
skirmishing had ensued and the Confederates began to shell the Union position with
16

Davis, The Battle of New Market, Page 76-84

17

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66

18

Correspondence between Breckinridge and Imboden, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1 Correspondence (Harrisburg: The National Historical
Society, 1971), 73
19

Murdock, E. C. “The Battle of New Market.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3 (June 1976): 668-69.
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artillery. The decision to postpone a full-scale frontal infantry assault and instead rely on
artillery to weaken the enemy position represented a sound tactical decision, as it limited
the potential for heavy losses. Although the Union position was under direct Confederate
artillery fire, the Federals elected to hold their line rather than assault the Confederate
artillery. By simply maintaining consistent artillery fire, the Confederates may also have
hoped to draw the Federals into assaulting their position. Although this tactic did not
achieve the desired effect, it did represent another sound decision as it had the potential to
force Sigel’s subordinates to assault the Confederate defensive position.20
By 11:00 A.M. Sigel had positioned the majority of his force in the middle of a
series of undulating hills just west of town. These hills have relatively low slope and
were not confined by overly steep ravines or other topographical constraints. To the west
of Sigel’s line was the Shenandoah River, which prevented a Confederate flanking
maneuver around the Federal right. Sigel’s decision to anchor his line along the river,
thus removing any threat of a Confederate attack from that side, was sound as it would be
quite difficult for any sizeable Confederate force to ford the Shenandoah at this location.
Despite the security of the Federal right, Sigel failed to secure his left flank on any
topographical feature. Furthermore, the Union commander did little to ensure the
protection of his left by positioning any significant units there to prevent a flanking
attempt. This grave error represents an important tactical mistake as it placed the Federal
position at serious risk.21

20

Sigel’s report, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 76

21

Murdock, E. C. “The Battle of New Market.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3 (June 1976): 668-69.
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Breckinridge soon realized that the Confederate artillery bombardment had done
little to dislodge the Federals; therefore, he devised a plan to pair a frontal assault with a
daring flanking maneuver around the weak Federal left.22 Breckinridge ordered
Imboden’s cavalry brigade to charge around the Federal left flank while the infantry
brigades of Gabriel Wharton and John Echols were deployed against Sigel’s center.
Breckinridge’s force was outnumbered but the Confederate commander hoped to disperse
the Union troop concentration by forcing Sigel to thin his lines in order to protect his
flank. This helped to weaken the Federal focus on the center just in time for
Breckinridge’s infantry assault. This action demonstrated how Breckinridge had
redesigned his tactics to equalize numerical disparities on the field.23
The Confederate assault began smoothly and the Confederate infantry brigades
were able to expel Union Colonel Augustus Moor’s troops from their forward positions
in the middle of the field. Moor’s troops fell back toward the main body of Sigel’s force
around a small knoll known as Bushong’s Hill.24 Captain Carl Heintz in a panicked
correspondence to Major General Stahel stated that Moor’s force was too weak to hold
his position long and desperately requested reinforcements.25 However, Moor’s poorly
positioned force did not receive reinforcements before being swept from the field. Moor,
in his official report, admitted that his force was severely outnumbered and only managed
to get off one volley before being forced to retreat.26 Although the Confederates had
22

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66

23

Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 45-53

24

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66

25

Report of Captain C. Heintz, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 461

26

Report of Colonel Moor, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 79
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expelled the Federals from their initial position, the southern lines were beginning to
become disoriented and in need of realignment in order to effectively continue the
assault. Breckinridge ordered a halt to his attack so as to re-form his units for the next
assault on the Federal stronghold around the Bushong’s Farm. The decision to stop the
Confederate advance was a necessary pause as it was essential for the southern
commanders to ensure a cohesive battle line. In addition to the adjustment of the
infantry, it was essential that the Confederates reposition their artillery as well. Up to this
point, the advancing southern brigades enjoyed the added support of artillery, which the
smaller Confederate units desperately relied upon. As they came closer to the Federal
emplacement around the Bushong Farm, the gray troops began to outpace their cannons
and they needed to move up their artillery to cover the remainder of their advance. This
further delayed their attack giving Sigel valuable time to organize his defense.27
By mid afternoon, Breckinridge reinitiated his attack on Sigel, but the attack
began to stall as his troops approached Bushong’s Hill. The Federals were able to stave
off the Confederate advance and disrupt the cohesiveness of the southern battle lines.28
As the southerners attempted to take the hill, they began to suffer losses and units started
to fall into retreat. Federal rifle fire was inflicting casualties in the southern ranks and
attrition was beginning to significantly reduce the already outnumbered Confederate
forces.29 It is unclear why Breckinridge did not elect to flank around the right of the
Federal strongpoint with his infantry. The Confederate commander was already

27

Davis, The Battle of New Market, Page 20-31

28

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 67

29

Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 66-76
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outnumbered and desperately needed to preserve as much of his fighting force as
possible. Given this scenario, it would have behooved the southern general to formulate
a less dangerous assault rather than order a frontal attack over open ground.30
With the prospect of defeat suddenly looming, the Confederate commander took
desperate measures to strengthen his assault on Sigel’s position. Up to this point in the
war, the cadets from VMI had seen little action and had not been in the hottest part of the
battle. However, as the Confederates found themselves in an increasingly tenuous
position, it became apparent that the young cadets would need to support the flailing
southern line. Although the cadets only numbered around 250, their arrival on the field
tipped the scales in the southerners’ favor, as it gave the Confederate center the necessary
reinforcements they needed to overcome Sigel’s position around the hill. In his after
action report, Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Scott Shipp Smith wrote that the cadets
performed an essential duty by filling the gaps in the Confederate lines. He stated that
the Confederate frontal assault was costly and without the reinforcements may have
failed. Smith goes on to explain how the Confederates utilized the river to their left as a
natural anchor point for their line. He expressed that this prevented the prospect of a
flanking attack, thus allowing the Confederates to press their assault with confidence.31
Additionally, their lack of experience and general naiveté of the horrors of war also may
have contributed to the confidence of their assault as they were not fully aware of the
risks they were taking. This stands as strong evidence that the successfulness of the
Confederate assault on Bushong’s Hill directly correlates to the numerical strength of the

30

Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 121

31

Report of S. Shipp, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 91

15
units involved. Here the tactical decision to deploy the cadets combined with the
numerical advantage of their presence resulted in the successfulness of the attack. Union
Major Henry Peale commented in an after action report how the Confederates “in three
strong lines” overwhelmed the Federal position with superior numbers and great
ferocity.32

32

War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I. Volume. 37. Part
1 Correspondence (Harrisburg: The National Historical Society, 1971), 81

16

33

Sigel, in turn, launched a series of uncoordinated counter attacks in an attempt to
break the southern line. Union Colonel George D. Wells described the disorganization of
these maneuvers in his battle report. He stated that the Union line was plagued with
conflicting orders and many units did not know whether to retreat or advance. He even
cites one instance where he grabbed a color bearer and ordered him to retreat while the

33

Colonna –Morgan, Map of Battle of New Market, VMI Archives, Lexington, VA. Accessed December 8,
2014. http://www.vmi.edu/assets/0/430/434/811/5f7ba365-dc44-46ac-9431-d06cc47e592a.jpg
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remainder of the regiment held their position.34 Given the evidence, it is clear that
Sigel’s decision to counter attack diluted his force around Bushong’s Farm. Once Sigel
had begun to disperse his force, the Confederates were able to concentrate their efforts on
singular, smaller elements along the Federals’ position, thus creating a series of micro
scenarios where the southerners possessed the numerical advantage. With the added
pressure from the cadets and southern cavalry, Sigel’s line began to crumble into retreat.
The southerners hurriedly pursued the withdrawing Federals as they moved north toward
Mount Jackson. Severely pressed, Sigel’s troops were forced to abandon their artillery as
they rushed to extricate themselves from the field and create distance from the now
inspired Confederates.35
By early evening, what was left of the Federal force under Sigel retreated north of
the Shenandoah River with enough time to burn the bridge across it and thus limit the
southern pursuit. Sigel’s decision to destroy the bridge bought the Federals necessary
time to reorganize their force and prepare for another southern attack.36 However, it was
late evening and both sides were exhausted from the day’s fighting. Rather than pursue
the Federals into the night, Breckinridge elected to hold his position, thus concluding any
major action at New Market.37 Breckinridge stated in his report on the battle that the
destruction of the bridge prevented the Confederates from easily pursuing the Federals, as
it would have required his force to find a ford and cross the river in the night.38
34

Report of Henry Peale, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 83

35

Davis, The Battle of New Market, Page 56-67

36

Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 67

37

Murdock, E. C. “The Battle of New Market.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3

38

Report of Breckinridge, War of the Rebellion Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 87
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What would become known, as the Battle of New Market is a superb example of
the profound relationship between numerical disparities, partially caused by attrition and
tactics. Although Breckinridge made a few mistakes, he avoided costly blunders and was
able to preserve his fighting force for those critical moments on the battlefield. From the
opening phases of the battle, the Confederate general did a superb job of deploying his
troops where they would be the most effective. His decision to flank around the Federal
left with cavalry, although not entirely successful, represented a sound tactical decision.
Furthermore, his choice to deploy the VMI cadets at that pivotal moment during the
battle demonstrated sound tactical reasoning, which helped equalize numerical
deficiencies caused by attrition. Breckinridge did such a good job of employing tactics
that would equalize numerical deficiencies that Sigel wrote after the battle, “ A severe
battle was fought today at New Market between our forces and those of Echols and
Imboden, under Breckinridge. Our troops were overpowered by superior numbers.”39
Here, Sigel admits that the Confederates utilized numbers to defeat him and how they
played a pivotal role in the battle outcome.
Prior to the battle, the Federals had a numerical advantage that Sigel should have
exploited to either envelope or overwhelm Breckinridge’s inferior force. However, Sigel
squandered this opportunity with poor tactical decisions that placed his force in the center
of a sweeping field with little protection. Furthermore, Sigel failed to recognize the
importance of protecting his flanks, and performed half hearted counter attacks, which
did not possess the troop strength to sufficiently overwhelm the Confederate line. It also
stands to reason that Sigel may have placed too much faith in his position at Bushong’s
Farm, which did not afford him the tactical supremacy he needed. This may have led to
39

Sigel’s Report, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 478, 493

19
him retaining his force there for too long, which allowed the Confederates to sufficiently
reinforce their lines and overwhelm him.40
At the onset of the battle, the Confederates only had approximately 4,000 men at
their disposal while Sigel’s effective fighting force numbered closer to 6,500. By the
evening of May 15, the Federals had moved north toward Strasburg suffering nearly 900
casualties. The departure of Sigel left the southern half of the Valley temporarily in
Confederate control. The Confederates had suffered approximately 500 casualties, which
briefly forced Breckinridge to remain in the region while troops were detailed to care for
the wounded.41 The Confederate victory at New Market allowed the southern army to
retain control of the crop production in the region, along with preserving the vitally
important rail lines in central Virginia.42
This crucial southern victory had profound effects amongst the Union command
structure as well. Grant was not pleased with Sigel’s performance at New Market and
swiftly replaced him with Major General David Hunter as commander of the Army of the
Shenandoah. Grant, in his memoirs, stated, “Sigel’s record is almost equally brief. He
moved out, it is true, according to program; but just when I was hoping to hear of good
work being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement from
Halleck: ‘Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run; never did
anything else.’ The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him
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roughly, leaving him short six guns.”43 The Confederates also realigned their forces
following New Market. Having suffered serious losses at Spotsylvania, General Lee
ordered Breckinridge, along with the majority of his small force, to return to Lee’s Army
of Northern Virginia. This left the Shenandoah Valley essentially vacant with no
significant Confederate force to confront a Union incursion. Only Imboden’s cavalry
brigade was left to monitor Union troop movements in the now vulnerable region.44
Hunter quickly mobilized his force of approximately 10,000 men and began a
march toward Harrisonburg. During this time, Imboden resumed the tactics as practiced
under Breckinridge and attempted to harass and slow Hunter’s movements. Imboden,
however, did not possess nearly enough troops to significantly impede Hunter’s advance
for an extended period. Even so, Imboden’s efforts did provide Lee with valuable
intelligence and bought the Confederates in central Virginia the necessary time to
organize a defensive plan.45
Hard-pressed by Grant at Cold Harbor, Lee had no one besides Imboden’s meager
force to confront Hunter’s army in the Shenandoah Valley. In an act of desperation, Lee
called upon Brigadier General William “Grumble” Jones to organize a defense force to
protect the region. Jones had previously been tasked with defending western Virginia
along with portions of eastern Tennessee. Jones responded to Lee’s request with
approximately 3,800 troops, which were hastily rushed to aid Imboden’s diminutive
43
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force.46 Imboden’s efforts represent excellent tactical decisions based upon the numerical
constraints of his force. Imboden avoided any costly battles with the larger Federal army
and in turn preserved his force so as to buy time for Confederate reinforcements to
arrive.47
While Imboden awaited the arrival of Jones and his men, Hunter’s army neared
Harrisonburg and by June 3 had arrived in the town. Imboden did an excellent job of
holding the Federals in place by blocking their primary avenue south via the Valley Pike.
By doing this, Imboden successfully stalled the entire Union force by simply blocking a
natural bottleneck in their path. By June 4, Jones had arrived at Imboden’s position near
Mount Crawford. Here, the two Confederate commanders devised a plan to lure the
Federals out from their position around Port Republic and strike them with the bulk of the
Confederate force. Imboden was instructed to move his contingent to Mount Meridian
where he was instructed to draw Hunter’s force toward him but not to directly engage the
Federals. This was a sound tactical decision that was once again predicated on numerical
weaknesses. Here, Jones did a good job of directing his subordinates to avoid direct
contact with the enemy so as to mitigate potential losses.48
On June 6, Hunter’s force initiated their attack on Imboden’s position. Imboden
did as he was instructed and attempted to slow the Federal advance, but avoided any
direct clash with the enemy. Imboden slowly lured Hunter’s force closer to the main
body of the Confederate army. This tactic worked quite well; by luring the Federals
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toward the Confederate position, it allowed the southern commander to select the place of
battle that would be most advantageous to his force.49 For his main effort, Jones had
selected a defensive position near Piedmont, which offered the Confederates the
maximum tactical advantage. Hastily constructed breastworks and the difficult terrain
made this an adequate place to defend against Hunter’s assault.50
Union Colonel Augustus Moor’s brigade initiated the assault on the Confederate
strongpoint and almost immediately began to suffer heavy casualties. Here, the
numerically inferior southerners used the benefits of a defensive position to help equalize
their deficiencies in manpower.51 When Moor’s brigade began to fall back, Colonel
Joseph Thoburn rushed his brigade forward to take some of the pressure off of Moor’s
stammering assault. Even with Thoburn’s reinforcements in line, the Confederates were
still able to direct sufficient artillery and rifle fire at the two Union brigades to force them
into retreat. 52
The Federals regrouped and reinforced Moor’s brigade and attempted a second
assault on the Confederate position, but the southerners enjoyed the cover of breastworks,
which drastically improved their survivability rate under enemy fire, mitigating
casualties. Union Colonel William G. Ely stated in his post battle report that the
Confederate position was very well defended and that Federal efforts to expel the
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southerners proved unfruitful for the better part of the day.53 The second attack by Moor
began to suffer heavy casualties and was repulsed like the attacks before it. Up to this
point, the southerners had done a superb job of resisting a much larger force simply by
not exposing themselves to unnecessary risks or performing casualty inducing
maneuvers. Jones’ performance up until this point had been excellent as he tailored his
tactics to suit his smaller army. The Federal Colonel Jacob M. Campbell commented on
Jones’ defense by describing the southern trenches and stating “This appeared to be the
key to their position, and they held it most obstinately for some time.”54 However,
following the successful defense against two successive Federal attacks, Jones attempted
to exploit the Union reverse and ordered a small counter assault on Moor’s retreating
brigade.55
Unfortunately for Jones, this counterattack did not possess the necessary troop
strength to overcome Moor’s brigade and the southerners were quickly forced back to
their breastworks. This Confederate maneuver ultimately failed because Jones neglected
to commit enough troops at once and his halfhearted attack was easily repulsed. This
decision represents the first major mistake made by Jones on June 5. Realizing his error,
Jones realigned his force and committed Brigadier General John C. Vaughn’s brigade to
assault Moor’s beleaguered unit. Although the addition of Vaughn’s brigade to the attack
may have been what the Confederates needed to crush Moor, it had disastrous
implications for the remainder of the southern battle line.56 Prior to this realignment,
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Vaughn had occupied the center of the southern position. By shifting Vaughn’s troops to
assist in the assault on Moor, it left the Confederate center in a dangerously precarious
situation. 57
The Federals immediately capitalized on this mistake as Thoburn and Moor
rushed their brigades into the gap. Now Jones’ small force was disproportionately
dispersed along the Confederate line and unable to effectively repel the Union spearhead.
The two Federal brigades were able to slice the Confederate position in two and almost
immediately the southern line began to crumble into retreat. Colonel Ely lauded the
effectiveness of the Union advance in his report of the battle that this final charge on the
Confederate stronghold shattered the southern position.58 As Jones frantically attempted
to rally his troops, he was struck by enemy fire and killed. This loss shattered the
Confederate command structure as it led to significant confusion among the ranks as to
who was in command.59 Major General David Hunter articulated the effectiveness of the
Union assault in his report stating that “Moor’s brigade rushed over the works in front,
and a brigade of cavalry, under Colonel John Wynkoop, charged upon his right flank and
rear. The enemy fled in confusion.”60 During the ensuing retreat, the southerners lacked
organized and effective leadership, which led to a significant number of Confederates
being captured.
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Hunter used his greater numbers to exploit his success and pounced on the fleeing
Confederates who were unable to organize a cohesive rear guard action. The southerners
retreated back toward Lynchburg, leaving Harrisonburg and Staunton firmly in Union
control. The sense of desperation following this costly Confederate defeat is indicated in
Colonel E.G. Lee’s after action letter to Lee in which he pleaded for reinforcements.
Colonel Lee’s statements were not unfounded, as the Confederate force had suffered
severe casualties and, of the approximately 5,300 Confederate troops engaged at the
battle, roughly 400 were killed or wounded. During the disorganized retreat, the pursuing
Federals captured another 1,000 Confederates. What had started out as a successful day
for the Confederates had rapidly spiraled into a disastrous defeat.61
Hunter’s force fared much better and of the approximately 8,500 men present,
they suffered 900 casualties. Although Hunter’s force initially struggled to crack the
southern position, they were eventually able to exploit weaknesses in Confederate
command decisions.62 At the onset of the battle, Jones possessed a much smaller force,
which he should have attempted to preserve by maintaining his defensive position at
Piedmont. Jones should have never put his small force at such risk by attempting to leave
his breastworks and attack Moor’s brigade. The southerners had been successfully
repulsing Federal attacks with ease and there was no reason to forfeit the tactical
advantages offered by the trenches. Furthermore, Jones committed a grave error when he
opened a gap in his small force by realigning Vaughn’s troops. This fatal mistake, the

61

“Piedmont,” CWSAC Battle Summaries: The American Battlefield Protection Program National Park
Service, accessed February 12, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/
62

Patchan, The Forgotten Fury, Page 151

26
culmination of both numerical deficiencies and tactical errors, ultimately cost Jones the
day, and his life.63
Following the devastating defeat at what would become known as the Battle of
Piedmont, Lee recognized that he needed to devote a force to operate consistently in the
Valley to ensure the protection of his rail lines to the deep South, as they were essential to
the survival of the capitol. Further, the continued presence of Hunter forced Lee to act
quickly and he dispatched Jubal Anderson Early with approximately 15,000 troops to
defend Lynchburg. The city had become an important hub in the supply structure that
supported Richmond. It had a hospital along with other supply depots that made it an
integral component to Lee’s defensive strategy. Rail lines that passed near the city were
also vitally important, as they were utilized to rapidly shift troops to and from the
Shenandoah Valley.64 With Lynchburg in peril, Imboden and Brigadier General John
McCausland’s cavalry continued to harass and impede, if possible, Hunter’s movements
in the Shenandoah. During this phase of the campaign, very little transpired other than
minor skirmishes and occasional clashes between cavalry units. However, by June 11
Hunter’s force had reached Lexington and in the ensuing days burned VMI in retaliation
for their participation in the battle of New Market.65
By June 17, Early’s force had arrived outside of Lynchburg and sought to
confront Hunter’s force there. Early, however, opted not to make the same mistake as
Jones by forcing a needless and costly attack. Instead, Early examined the terrain and
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sought to capitalize on existing fortifications and topography. Early elected to utilize a
redoubt approximately 1.5 miles from Lynchburg as the anchor point for his line. On
either side of this fortification, he extended his trenches so as to prevent the possibility of
a Federal flanking attack.66 Early ordered Major General John B. Gordon’s division to
defend the left flank of the redoubt while William Lewis situated his brigade to guard the
Confederate right. Early’s decision to occupy this position, rather than attacking
Hunter’s, was sound as it prevented unnecessary casualties while simultaneously
protecting the rail lines near the city.67 Early’s arrival to Lynchburg, just before Hunter,
gave him the opportunity to create an intricate defense that gave him a substantial
advantage. Grant expressed this after the war when he wrote, “To meet this movement
under General Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg before Hunter.” Grant went on to lament how the arrival of the Confederates
before Hunter precluded the Federals from taking and holding the city.68
Hunter claimed in his after action report that he was unsure of the size of the
Confederate force and that throughout the night before, had heard the movement and
drums of what he claimed was a sizeable enemy force. Uncertain of the Confederate
troop strength, he initiated a series of probing maneuvers to gauge the strength of Early’s
force, which numbered about 14,000.69 Hunter, although possessing about 17,000 men,
made a sound tactical decision by simply probing the southern line. This tactic only put a
small segment of his force at risk and did not open Hunter up to sustain heavy casualties,
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thus preserving his numerical supremacy. Although this tactic was sound, it would not
have been necessary if Hunter had acted more aggressively earlier in the day as the
Confederate force was slow to get in position. Nonetheless, Hunter ordered Jeremiah
Sullivan’s and George Crook’s divisions forward to test the strength of the Confederate
center. This action proved unfruitful as the southerners had developed a well-defended
series of battle lines that made an assault here a costly prospect. Meanwhile, Colonel
Alfred Duffié was tasked with flanking around the Confederate right and exploiting any
potential weaknesses there.70 This action availed little success for the attacking Federals
as Confederate Brigadier John McCausland was able to repulse the Union flanking
attempt. Furthermore, the Confederates worked to extend their lines in order to prevent
Federal flanking endeavors.71 Hunter wrote after the action regarding the Confederate
positions that they were seemingly impenetrable. He clarified his reasoning for not
pressing the attack when he stated, “Their works consisted of strong redoubts on each of
the main roads entering the town…flanked on either side by rifle pits.”72
Realizing the futility of an attack on the well-defended Confederate positions,
Hunter opted to recall his deployed units and relinquished control of Lynchburg to the
Confederates. The Battle of Lynchburg ultimately resulted in little more than elaborate
troop movements with moments of heavy skirmishing. Although no dramatic clash
transpired, this battle is a powerful example of how the prospect of attrition dictated
Confederate tactics, thus resulting in a strategic victory with virtually no losses. It is also
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evidence that Hunter was keenly aware of the impact of attrition and how strong enemy
defensive emplacements could change the course of a battle. Early did an excellent job
of defending his flanks so as to prevent any attempt by the Federals to reach his rear.
Early’s choice to remain in his defenses rather than force an attack was excellent. By
doing this, Early sustained no casualties while achieving the desired effect of protecting
Lynchburg. Overall, this low casualty battle is a powerful demonstration of how attrition
can be controlled by tactics and in turn result in a strategic success. Following the action
at Lynchburg, Hunter retreated out of the Shenandoah Valley into West Virginia leaving
the region in Confederate hands. The lack of casualties at Lynchburg allowed Early to
immediately begin operations in the Valley without needing to reorganize or tend to the
wounded. By preserving his force of 14,000 men, Early was able to throw off Union
operations in the region and capitalize on new opportunities.73
The battles of New Market, Piedmont, and Lynchburg all stand as excellent
examples of the correlation between tactics and attrition. The relationship between these
two factors is obvious when analyzing the conditions that led to the Confederate victory
at New Market. The ability to consistently manage changes on the battlefield while
mitigating risks was essential to southern success at this battle. This relationship further
crystallizes when examining the blunder at Piedmont. What initially appeared as a
Confederate victory rapidly evolved into a complete failure as the southern commander
failed to account for the casualties he would receive by splitting his force. Furthermore,
the decision to divide his army was a severe tactical mistake that resulted in nearly 1,000
men being captured. Finally, the Confederate success at Lynchburg stands as fitting coda
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for this phase of the campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley as it is a prime example of the
interplay between tactics and attrition. Here, Early avoided costly maneuvers thus
preserving his force by either forcing Hunter to attack or retreat. Together, these three
battles, when juxtaposed, demonstrate a pattern that develops between battlefield tactics
and the ever-looming risk of attrition.
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Chapter Two: Early’s Valley Campaign
By 1864, the Shenandoah Valley had become accustomed to the horrors of war.
Since the early days of the conflict, both the Union and Confederacy had vied to assert
their supremacy in the Valley. By the summer of 1864, the war was going progressively
worse for the Confederates and by June, Robert E. Lee’s army was encircled while
attempting to defend Petersburg from Ulysses S. Grant’s besieging force.
Many explanations for the outcome of various campaigns have been made and
many emphasize an array of topics. This research, however, will examine the
relationship between battlefield decisions and attrition and how together they altered the
outcome of the campaign. For the purposes of this study, attrition will be defined as any
time that troops are no longer capable or effective in combat roles. Attrition, in this
sense, is quite often referring to casualties but also general fatigue. It can, however, refer
to the detailing of troops to tend to wounded, or any other activity not a direct result of
fighting. Furthermore, attrition may refer to the elimination of usable and effective
troops due to the chaos and disorganization of battle.
As the Union stranglehold around Richmond tightened, the Confederate General
Robert E. Lee devised a strategy to alleviate some of the pressure on the beleaguered city.
He instructed General Jubal Anderson Early to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Union
forces so as to retain Confederate control of the region and its resources. In addition to
regaining control of the Valley, Lee tasked Early with striking at points north of the
Valley and possibly threatening Washington D.C. The task of sweeping the Valley of
Union troops was not easy, but the retreat of Union General David Hunter’s army into
West Virginia made this temporarily possible. This left the Shenandoah clear of any
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significant Union force to contest a Confederate advance. The vacated Shenandoah
Valley provided an opportunity for Early’s southerners to pursue the second part of Lee’s
order, which was to disrupt Union operations north of the Valley and possibly threaten
the defenses around Washington. It was Lee’s hope that the presence of a strong
Confederate force disrupting railroads and challenging Union supremacy in the region
would cause concern and warrant a realignment of Union troops.74 Even Grant, in his
memoirs, recognized the implications of leaving the Valley void of any Federal armies
when he stated, “Meantime the valley was left open to Early’s troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this condition of
affairs and moved on Washington.”75 It is doubtful that Lee realistically expected Early
to occupy Washington D.C.; however, it was plausible that the defenses around the
municipality could be seriously harassed if Early effectively marshaled his resources and
swiftly moved down the Valley toward Northern Virginia. If points north of the Potomac
or Washington itself could be threatened, it might result in a dilution of the Federal army
around Petersburg, thus alleviating pressure on the Confederate army defending the city.
Early made good use of the vacated Shenandoah Valley and rapidly moved north
toward Winchester, Virginia. The Confederates decided against remaining in the Valley
but rather employed a more aggressive strategy. Early opted to continue north and after
passing through Harpers Ferry was soon situated just outside of Frederick, Maryland. He
had successfully moved his entire army north and had prevented it from dispersing over
the long march.76 By advancing beyond Winchester, the southerners were operating in
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enemy territory and needed to have all troops readily available so as to take advantage of
time sensitive situations. He mitigated his deficiencies in manpower by maneuvering in
such a manner that maximized the potential of his small army. Early’s efforts to prevent
the dilution of his force are evidenced in various decisions from July 1-9. On July 5,
Early decided to bypass the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry rather than attempting to
take the position with his whole army and subsequently need to leave a contingent of men
to occupy the town and defend it.77 The decision to maneuver around Harpers Ferry
represented a sound tactical move for the Confederates. By engaging the small Federal
garrison defending the town, Early would have lost valuable time that would have given
the Union forces closer to Washington the opportunity to improve their defenses. It is
difficult to speculate how many casualties may have been incurred by an attempt to take
Harpers Ferry, but it is certain that it would have consumed time and resulted in potential
losses. Following his maneuvering around Harpers Ferry, Early quickly moved across
the Potomac at Shepherdstown and advanced toward Frederick, Maryland. The
Confederates met light resistance and skirmished with Federal cavalry until finally
arriving on the outskirts of Frederick, Maryland on July 8. Here, Early was presented
with an important decision that determined the nature of his operations for days to come.
The Confederate army had the opportunity to occupy and raze the town, which certainly
would have been a fulfillment of Lee’s order to draw Union attention away from
Petersburg and Richmond, but rather than getting mired in a resource-consuming pseudo
occupation, or spending the valuable time to burn the town, Early opted for a more
expedient approach. Early held Frederick for ransom and urged the city officials to pay
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the Confederates a sum of $200,000 to prevent him from burning the city. The officials
eagerly paid the ransom, which kept Early from delaying around the town longer than
necessary.78 The ransom represented an important Confederate success, as it was a
Union embarrassment and demonstrated to the public that the Confederates still exercised
the ability to threaten the Northern population. Furthermore, Early’s decision to avoid an
occupation and keep his army moving east was tactically sound, as it kept his force
together and allowed his army to retain a numerical advantage over smaller Union forces
operating east of Frederick.79
The Union high command, aware of Early’s presence north of the Potomac,
dispatched two infantry brigades from the Richmond and Petersburg area to address the
new Confederate threat. However, until these reinforcements arrived, the Federals had
only a small force of fewer than 3,000 men that could hope to delay the advance of
Early’s army, which consisted of approximately 14,000 troops. Union Major General
Lew Wallace positioned his small force at Monocacy Junction where he believed a
bottleneck existed that the Confederates would need to pass through in order to attack
Washington or Baltimore.80 By July 8, only a fraction of the troops dispatched from
Petersburg had arrived to reinforce Wallace and the Federal troops were drastically
outnumbered. Grant recognized that Wallace’s efforts would only at best delay the
Confederates and wrote after the war “He (Wallace) could hardly have expected to defeat
him (Early) badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until Washington could be put
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into a state of preparation for his reception.”81 With the addition of General James B.
Rickett’s Division of approximately 3,500 men, Wallace’s force still had less than 7,000
troops at its disposal.82 Early’s efforts in the days prior gave the southerners a numerical
advantage as the Confederate general had prevented the dispersion and dilution of his
force. The Confederates severely outnumbered the Federals nearly two to one as the
southerners numbered approximately 14,000.83 Early initiated a series of well-formulated
probing maneuvers that were designed to give the Confederates a more complete
appraisal of the size and positions of the Union army. Early’s actions indicate that he
was aware of the potential for a large Union force to be operating in the area as he was
moving in northern territory. Furthermore, Early marched among a population that was
less likely to provide valuable intelligence of enemy positions and useful topographical
reports. This lack of key intelligence forced Early to maneuver more cautiously as he
recognized how his lack of intelligence prevented overly aggressive tactics. In addition
to these shortcomings in intelligence and civilian support, Early was operating as an
independent army far from any viable reinforcements. To this end, it was imperative that
the Confederates move cautiously.84
It is necessary to recognize how topography influenced Early’s decisions. The
Union force under Lew Wallace had positioned itself overlooking the Monocacy River so
as to impede the advance of any Confederate attack. The only viable bridge into
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Monocacy Junction was also well defended as the northerners had utilized a series of
structures and trenches to create an imposing fortification.85 If Early were to attack
Wallace’s troops, he would need to cross the river at some point. Rather than performing
a frontal assault or crossing the well protected bridge, Early effectively employed a series
of flanking maneuvers that allowed his army to cross the river approximately a half mile
north and south of Monocacy Junction, thus keeping the Confederates out of range while
they crossed the river. By doing this, Early almost entirely bypassed the Union
stronghold at the bridge.86 Here, the prospect of casualties directly impacted Early’s
tactics and demonstrates how the Confederate commander designed his attack in a
fashion that would preserve his small fighting force while neutralizing his opponent.
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decision-making
making process at Monocacy and
In his memoirs, Early articulates his decision
explains how his desire to mitigate needless losses helped shape tactics. He explains how
a frontal assault across the river would be quite costly and that he sought a way
wa around
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the Union center.88 The Confederates split their forces into three separate wings each
responsible for pressing the attack in a different direction. Early dispatched Major
General Robert E. Rodes’ division to strike Wallace’s position north of Monocacy
Junction. Rodes’ Division outnumbered Erastus Tyler’s brigade and quickly
overwhelmed the Federal contingent forcing them to retreat to the east. In addition to
Rodes’ attack, the Confederates employed Major General Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s
division to divert Union troops to the center of Wallace’s line by feinting a frontal
assault, which subsequently weakened the Federal’s flanks.89 Early’s memoirs indicate
that Ramseur’s Division was to act in a diversionary capacity rather than to attempt to
drive the Union center from the field, which according to Early would be quite costly.
Early’s superior numbers allowed him to envelop the Union position and overwhelm
Wallace’s much smaller force.90 It is important to recognize the tactical and
organizational difficulties inherent to this attack. Wallace’s defenders had positioned
themselves in relatively static positions and initially did not need to concern themselves
with complex maneuvers. Early, however, was forced to manage and coordinate a
myriad of moving parts that were all mutually dependent on one another. The
Confederate general needed to synchronize all of his attacks to achieve a victory that did
not come with high southern casualties. In this regard, Early faced a much more complex
tactical equation than that of Wallace as he attempted to push the Federals from their
stronghold.
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Once across the river, the Confederate commander encountered a new series of
challenges. To the south of Monocacy Junction existed a series of undulating hills and
obstacles that were just high enough to obscure the position of Wallace’s main force.
Confederate Brigadier General John McCausland’s cavalry was the first to come across
the 1,500 entrenched Federal troops lying in wait on the other side of the hills.91 After an
initial assault on the Union position, Early realized McCausland’s cavalry did not posses
the combat power to overcome the Union line. Early utilized his numerical superiority as
he ordered John B. Gordon’s entire division to attack the Union strong point in hopes that
overwhelming force would quickly dispatch the enemy and limit casualties.92 In John
Gordon’s memoirs, he recalls the rough terrain that the Union used to their advantage.
He elaborates on the various difficulties that existed in attempting to march a battle line
through various obstructions such as fences and ravines. He explains these obstructions
would immediately cause the Confederate line to become “tangled and confused.”93
Rather than attack the Union with various piecemeal maneuvers that would most likely
result in high losses and be repulsed, Early committed Gordon’s entire division to rapidly
address the problem and subsequently sustained relatively few casualties. Despite the
rough terrain, Gordon’s division overwhelmed the Union position on the southern portion
of the field and successfully drove them into retreat.94 Gordon reminisced on this
moment in his memoir as he praised his troops and the enthusiasm, which resonated
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throughout his ranks as they charged and broke the Federal position. Gordon recalled, “I
ordered ‘Forward!’ and forward they went. I recall no charge of the war, except that of
the 12th of May against Hancock, in which my brave fellows seemed so swayed by an
enthusiasm which amounted almost to a martial delirium; and the swell of the Southern
yell rose high above the din of battle as they rushed upon the resolute Federals and hurled
them back upon the second line.”95
Early’s plan to out flank the Union troops on either side of Monocacy Junction
directly resulted in fewer casualties and allowed the Confederates to take advantage of
their numerical superiority.96 By the evening of July 9, the Union force under Wallace
had vacated Monocacy Junction relinquishing control of the crossroads to the
Confederates.97 The southern victory was the result of conservative, casualty mitigating
maneuvers, as well as Early’s efforts to keep his army together and to preserve the
numerical strength of his force in the days leading up to the battle. Simply from a
numerical standpoint, it is clear that the Confederates reaped the benefit of having a
larger force that had not been whittled down by attrition from extraneous clashes in days
leading up to the battle. Estimates of the Monocacy engagement vary; however, most
reports indicate that the defending Union units suffered approximately 1,300 casualties
while the attacking Confederates suffered only 700.98
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Following the war, Early and John Gordon became fierce opponents, as they were
quite critical of each other’s actions during the conflict. This contention did not prevent
Early from applauding Gordon along with his other lieutenants in his memoirs as he
describes the Confederate attack as “gallant” and uses dramatic phrases such as “threw
the enemy into great confusion” and “forced him from his position.”99 Despite having to
cross a river and attack a well-positioned enemy, Early was able to win the day and
mitigate potential losses. His tactics evidence that he remained cautious during his
advance and subsequently preserved his fighting force. If Early did not make a concerted
effort to protect his fighting force, he could quickly find himself dramatically
outnumbered far from any reinforcements. It should be noted, when considering the roles
of tactics and attrition that Wallace’s diminutive force did not possess enough troops to
defend all the fords along the Monocacy River near Monocacy Junction. If Wallace
possessed the necessary troops to sufficiently extend his line, he may have prevented the
Confederate flanking attack. However, this numerical deficiency permitted Early to
perform his flanking maneuvers quite effectively, which resulted in a northern defeat.
This clash is excellent evidence of how tactics were dictated by the prospect of casualties
and the role that numerical disparities played in the conduct of battle.
The Federal defeat at Monocacy opened the route from Frederick, Maryland to
Washington D.C. and Early’s Confederates seized the opportunity to move on the Union
capital. Wallace’s troops represented the last remaining Union army between the
Confederates and the capital. Although Early had achieved a victory, it only spurred the
Union to bolster its defenses around Washington. Early had achieved limited success by
winning a minor battle at Monocacy, but he still desired to divert more attention from
99
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Richmond and Petersburg. Hoping to create disruption and calls for reinforcements to
the Army of the Potomac, he made few efforts to disguise his movements as he marched
toward Washington D.C. and by July 11, the southerners had reached the city’s outer
defenses. 100
It is not entirely clear what Early’s intentions were with regards to his assault on
Washington D.C. The city was well supplied, as it was not encircled or besieged in any
way. The city retained unimpeded access to the Potomac and necessary supplies arrived
daily to feed the garrison there. Furthermore, a ring of interconnected forts spanned the
circumference of the capital protecting the city. It was obvious, given the situation
around Richmond and Petersburg, that besieging a city required inordinately large armies
and access to an exponentially larger force than Early’s command. Considering these
factors, it stands to reason that Early had no real expectation of occupying or besieging
the massive city.101 Despite Washington’s extensive defenses, it should be noted that the
garrison had been significantly depleted as troops were pulled away from installations
like Fort Stevens to support the Union siege at Petersburg. Reports indicate that
approximately 13,000 Federals were present to defend the capital during the battle of
Monocacy. This number, however, is not representative of the actual number of
effective, usable troops available.102 Many of these were wounded or reserve units that
were not in actuality capable of contributing to the Union defenses. The number of
effective combat troops spread throughout various forts was closer to 9,000, as Grant had
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previously pulled units from these fortifications to replace casualties his force suffered at
Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.103 This dilution of Federal troops garrisoned in
Washington made the prospect of a successful Confederate attack at the very least
plausible.104
Although Early was able to keep his army together on the march from the
southern Shenandoah Valley to Monocacy, he was not as successful in his traverse from
Frederick to Washington. By the time lead elements of Early’s army had arrived around
the outskirts of the city, his troops were significantly disorganized, dispersed and they
were exhausted, being detailed to tend to the wounded and prisoners. Early even admits
in his memoirs that a great many men were detailed to bury dead and escort the gravely
wounded to the rear.105 The need to reorganize and address wounded and missing slowed
the march to Washington for many units. Rather than slow the advance of his entire
army so as to keep his force together, Early permitted elements of his army to outpace the
slower fatigued units, which spread his army out. Here, fatigue and casualties played an
important role in Confederate maneuvers as repercussions from the previous day’s battle
hindered the Confederate advance. In his memoirs, Early admits to detailing specific
units with time-consuming tasks that delayed their march to Washington. Early does
exonerate himself of some blame as he expounds on the inordinately hot and dusty
conditions, which slowed the march of the more fatigued units.106 The road to
Washington is a superb example of the relationship between tactics and effects of
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attrition. Early allowed attrition and disorganization to spread his army out and he lost
the ability to rapidly engage his entire force against the enemy.
Early’s actions in Maryland spurred Grant to finally dispatch divisions from the
VI and XIX corps to reinforce the positions around Washington. By July 11, vessels
carrying Union troops from Virginia arrived in Washington, D.C. almost at the same time
as lead elements of Early’s Army of the Valley approached the city’s protective ring.107
The initial phases of what would become known as the Battle of Fort Stevens are
inextricably linked to the previous day’s march and ultimately the Battle of Monocacy.
Although Early possessed a numerically superior force in total, he did not have the
necessary troops on line to strike at the Union defense. Early was forced to delay his
assault on the northern stronghold, which gave the Federals the advantage of time to
organize a defensive strategy.108 In his memoirs, General John B. Gordon explains the
grave implications of Early’s late arrival as he notes that lead elements of the Confederate
column saw that Fort Stevens was undermanned and could be easily taken if whole army
had been present. Gordon himself states that he saw entire breastworks left empty as the
Union defenders awaited reinforcements. Following Gordon’s critique of Early’s late
arrival at Washington, he goes into an analysis of Early’s character and hints that perhaps
Early lacked the courage necessary to go through with an attack of this nature. Gordon’s
estimation of Early’s tactical acumen would become progressively more negative as the
campaign continued.109 Perhaps Gordon believed that Early’s thin columns and slow
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march was not a mistake but in fact indicative of a deeper conservative timidity.
Regardless of motivation, the results and implications of Early’s actions were the same.
While the Confederates delayed, the Union enhanced their defenses at Fort Stevens and
prepared for an enemy assault.110 Early does admit that when lead elements of his army
arrived at Fort Stevens, the breastworks were “thinly manned”; however, this window of
opportunity quickly closed with the arrival of Federal reinforcements.111 Grant stated
after the war, “Early made his reconnaissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our entrenchments, which were very
strong, fully manned.”112 Early committed an error by allowing his army to arrive late
and piecemeal, but he also made another tactical error by delaying his assault, which only
made the prospect of a successful attack more precarious.
The Confederates were at a significant disadvantage as they prepared to assault
the Federals in a well-fortified position. Fort Stevens was an imposing fortification that
boasted nearly 20 heavy artillery pieces nestled behind extensive trenches and
embankments. The Union had designed the position to act as a strong point that could
dominate the northern approach to Washington. They cleared potential avenues of attack
around the fort so as to prevent an enemy from having any cover from the fort’s
artillery.113 Furthermore, the Confederates did not enjoy the numerical superiority, as

110

Cox, William V. “General Early’s Advance on the Capital and the Battle of Fort Stevens, pp. 140-146

111

Jubal Anderson Early, Jubal Early’s Memoirs, Page 390-392

112

Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, Page 500

113

Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid, Page 117-123

46
combat capable Confederates numbered approximately 10,000. Union forces, well
positioned behind imposing fortifications, numbered almost 9,000.114
Early could have opted for a full-blown assault, which would have required his
troops to cross a large open field while exposed to fire, during which the Union batteries
could easily cut large swaths in the Confederate battle line. The remaining troops that
survived the charge and Federal barrage would then need to scale the steep
embankment.115 If the southerners reached the fort, they would face a significant number
of Federals that would not easily relinquish control of the position. Compared to the
minor casualties sustained by the Confederates at Monocacy, an assault on Fort Stevens
could possibly cripple Early’s ability to continue operations north of the Potomac
River.116
Given the potential for significant Confederate losses, it behooved Early to
implement a more conservative strategy. On the afternoon of July 11, Early initiated a
series of probing measures that would allow him to gauge the strength of the Union
position. Similar to his tactics at Monocacy, it was important for Early to gain necessary
intelligence so as to avoid needless risk to his force. The Confederates deployed a series
of skirmish lines that were to ascertain the location and troop strength of Federal units
around the fort.117 However, any intelligence that the Confederates gathered could not be
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immediately acted upon as Early was still waiting for the remainder of his spread-out
force to arrive on the battlefield.
Because Early commenced his attack the evening of July 11, he allowed the
Federals to confirm the exact location of the Confederate attack. Prior to the Confederate
advance on Fort Stevens, Union leaders remained uncertain whether Fort Stevens, or one
of the other defensive fortifications ringing Washington, would be the intended target.
The Confederate skirmish line gave away Early’s intention to attack Fort Stevens, which
spurred the Union to bolster the units defending the fort.118 By the evening of July 11,
additional elements of the VI and XIX corps arrived to reinforce the existing defenders.
Early’s decision to initiate skirmishing and demonstrate intent to attack Fort Stevens
without his entire fighting force represents a tactical mistake, as it eliminated the prospect
of a Confederate surprise attack once Early’s entire force had assembled.119 If Early had
delayed his probing maneuvers until the remainder of his army had arrived, it may have
increased the possibility of mounting a successful assault. Furthermore, the Confederates
did not begin their attack until around 2:30 p.m. on July 11.120 Beginning operations this
late in the day limited the opportunity to press any attack to its full potential as a
Confederate advance could be derailed by nightfall. Engaging his troops late in the day
combined with the lack of his entire force present represents two tactical errors that could
have cost the Confederates dearly.121
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Despite the mistake of engaging the enemy without his entire army present, Early
did avoid some important pitfalls. On July 11, the Confederates limited their offensive
maneuvers to basic skirmishing, which kept the majority of Early’s troops out of any
significant danger. Early’s probing tactics were relatively low risk maneuvers, as his
skirmish lines were not concentrated enough to suffer heavy casualties. Part way through
the evening, the clash became a duel of sorts between Confederate snipers and Union
artillery. Finally, night fell and the skirmishing continued but did not lead to any
significant action. Early’s decision not to press any large scale attack in this instance is
to be applauded as it certainly may have resulted in significant Confederate losses. He
resisted the opportunity to attack and in doing so, preserved his fighting force.122 By
performing a full-scale attack on the Union position, the Confederates certainly may have
made an already risky situation into a very costly one. Given the existing evidence it is
plausible that Early never really intended to attack Washington, but simply lingered long
enough to pull additional Union reinforcements from Petersburg. In this sense Early’s
actions were quite successful as he managed to achieve an important goal at little cost.123
On the morning of July 12 Early resumed his scattered skirmishing tactics with
Federal units around Fort Stevens. The Confederates did not have any extensive or
complex strategy at this point other than to test the Union strength and attempt to
determine what, if any, potential weaknesses existed in the Federal line. The
Confederates resumed their sniping tactics from nearby houses and buildings that were
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within rifle range of the Union line.124 Following a few hours of the oppressive
Confederate sniping, the Federals reinitiated their artillery bombardment and significantly
damaged many of the homes and buildings the Confederates had been using for cover.
Despite the relatively effective artillery barrage, the Confederates were able to hold their
position and maintain their fire on the Federals’ position. The major action of the day
came around 4 p.m. when Brigadier General Daniel Bidwell was dispatched to quell the
Confederate harassment with a frontal assault.125 Bidwell’s brigade stepped off under
withering Confederate fire and immediately began to sustain significant casualties as
their battle line was exposed to heavy Confederate rifle fire. As the Union brigade neared
the Confederate position, they had also become the target of southern artillery and their
casualties began to increase exponentially. Despite the highly effective Confederate fire
the Federals were able to push the remaining southerners from their position in the rubble
and drive them from the field.126
The action at Fort Stevens did not produce significant casualties, but certainly had
profound effects for both sides as the Confederates gained increased attention from the
Union high command. By the end of the two-day battle, the Confederates had suffered
approximately 550 casualties. The northerners sustained around 400 dead and wounded
with the majority of casualties incurred during Bidwell’s assault on the Confederate
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position. Early ordered his troops to pull out of their positions around Fort Stevens the
night of July 12, thus concluding the battle.127
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at Monocacy. Furthermore, Early’s decision to begin his assault so late in the day on July
11 certainly limited the chances for the Confederates to exploit any weakness they
discovered in the Union line. Despite these important errors, Early managed to mitigate
casualties, preserve the effectiveness of his force, and continue his campaign. Rather
than force an attack that would have yielded heavy casualties, Early opted to maintain a
presence around Washington, which warranted a deeper Union commitment to the
defenses around the capital by drawing troops away from the siege at Petersburg. Rather
than risking his entire army to capture Fort Stevens and Washington, Early took a more
conservative approach by prolonging a threat to the city. In doing this, Early fulfilled a
portion of Lee’s initial order to threaten Washington and draw troops away from the area
around Petersburg and Richmond.129
The clash around Fort Stevens is an excellent example of the role of attrition
directly influenced Early’s tactics. It is also evident that his battle plan was designed so
as to limit potential casualties and to preserve his fighting force. Many historians agree
that Early could have taken Fort Stevens, but would have sustained heavy casualties in
doing so. It is also questionable as to what extent Early’s operations would have
benefitted from this costly attack. Given the size of Early’s force it is improbable that
they could have occupied D.C. for very long as Grant would have likely rushed
reinforcements from Petersburg that would require the Confederates to make a hasty
retreat. Early’s tactics achieved the desired result of draining Union troops from Virginia
while simultaneously limiting casualties.130 In this sense, the action around Washington
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can be deemed a Confederate success as it fulfilled Lee’s order without the high cost of
casualties and subsequent attrition.
By July 13, the Confederates returned across the Potomac River into Virginia and
began to make their way back toward Winchester. Although the Confederates had
withdrawn, the Federals defending Washington were not content with mere Confederate
retreat. Major General Horatio G. Wright rapidly mounted a pursuit force to attack Early
in his traverse back to the Shenandoah Valley. Wright organized elements of the VI and
XIX Corps to pursue the Confederates in hopes that they could trap the southerners
before they reached the relative safety of the Shenandoah Valley.131 Early’s army was
attempting to reach a pass in the Blue Ridge Mountains known as Snickers Gap where he
hoped to re-enter the Valley. The pursuing Federals realized this was Early’s intended
route and hoped to reach the southerners before they crossed the mountains. The arrival
of elements of the Army of West Virginia, which also sought to cut Early’s retreat off
before he reached the pass, reinforced Wrights pursuing troops.132
Early immediately implemented a series of screening maneuvers that were
designed to protect his flanks and allow the bulk of his army to continue moving toward
safety. Federal units, from the front and rear, slowly encircled the Confederates and it
was imperative that the southerners kept moving to avoid being trapped.133 Early
dispatched Brigadier General John B. McCausland’s cavalry to protect the retreating
Confederate’s left flank, while Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s division operated to the rear
of the retreating Confederate column to ensure that Union cavalry did not reach the
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vulnerable Confederates from behind.134 Lastly, Brigadier General Bradley Johnson was
tasked with protecting the southerners’ right flank and ensured that no elements of
Wright’s force could strike the northern portion of Early’s column. This elaborate
screening maneuver represents a brilliant use of Early’s resources so as to ensure the
forward movement of his army.135 With the encroachment of enemies from the rear and
west of Early’s position, he demonstrated a high degree of competence as he orchestrated
a myriad of elements so as to prevent a battle. It is evident that Early did not want to
fight at what became known as Heaton’s Crossroads. His tactics indicate that he was
continuously attempting to disengage from the enemy rather than form his troops for an
assault. In his memoirs Early indicates that he did not wish to turn and fight during his
withdrawal, but merely attempt to keep his army moving and to deny the Federals an
opportunity to fully engage his force.136 Despite being in Virginia, the Confederates still
operated in enemy held territory and were in a precarious position to stage a battle as
elements of two Federal armies moved closer.137
Early’s maneuvering at Heaton’s Crossroads demonstrates a superb effort to avoid
a fight and further exhibits Early’s desire to operate in a fashion that did not put his army
at risk of heavy casualties. As the day progressed, the Federals made multiple efforts to
probe the Confederate screen, but were continuously repulsed. Although the Federals
made multiple efforts to find a weakness and hinder the Confederate’s forward
progression, they ultimately failed. By the end of the day Early had achieved his
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intended goal of reaching the gap and crossing into the Shenandoah.138 Early’s casualtypreventing efforts limited what could have been a full-scale Federal attack into little more
than general harassment.139
The action around Heaton’s Crossroads demonstrates the direct correlation
between conservative tactics and subsequent low casualties. The Confederates, in this
instance, made a concerted effort to avoid a fight and it paid off as they avoided multiple
attempts by Wright to trap Early up against the approaching Army of West Virginia.140
Rather than endeavoring to engage elements of the approaching Union force, Early
mitigated potential attrition and once again preserved his force’s ability to fight at a later
date.
Including the action at Heaton’s Crossroads, the Confederates clashed with Union
pursuers three times from July 16 to July 20 At Snicker’s Ferry on July 18, the
withdrawing Confederates once again repulsed a Union attack and allowed Early to
continue his retreat into the Shenandoah. By July 20, elements of Early’s army had
reached Winchester, Virginia and were ordered to remain within the city. Confederate
intelligence alerted Major General Stephen Dodson Ramseur of a small Union contingent
of approximately 2,500 troops. Seeing an opportunity to strike at this smaller unit,
Ramseur enticed the Federals closer, baiting them with a thin skirmish line. Ramseur
then moved out of the city’s defenses toward Rutherford’s Farm and sought to surprise
the approaching Federals. Ramseur, however, was acting alone and outside the direction
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of Early.141 The Confederates were promptly routed from the field when Ramseur
initiated a poorly executed surprise attack that was flanked by the approaching Union
troops. Ramseur had been acting independently from the remainder of the Confederate
force and did not have the necessary troop strength to effectively extend his line and
prevent a Union flanking maneuver. This insubordination cost the Confederates the
battle and approximately 600 casualties. The action at Rutherford’s Farm is an excellent
example of the direct correlation between poor tactics and resulting heavy casualties.
Ramseur operated without support from the rest of Early’s force, which put his division
at risk and resulted in eventual defeat. Although this clash had little effect on the overall
conduct of the campaign, it stands as an excellent microanalysis of the relationship of
tactics and subsequent casualties.142
Following this defeat, Early moved his army 15 miles south to Fisher’s Hill,
Virginia in an effort to reorganize after days of pursuit from Union forces. The
Confederate retreat left the northern portion of the Valley open to a Union incursion. The
southerners’ withdrawal from Winchester suggested to Wright that the immediate
Confederate threat to the capital had been eliminated and that it was safe for the Union VI
and XIX Corps to return to the siege around Petersburg.143 One of Early’s primary tasks
was to ensure that the Union maintained a presence in the Shenandoah Valley so as to
deplete Federal resources encircling Petersburg. Early recognized that he needed to
continue operations against the Federals to prevent their return to Ulysses S. Grant’s
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siege efforts. Wright had left the Army of West Virginia to act as a sentinel in the
northern Shenandoah Valley, and Early saw the smaller Army of West Virginia under the
command of General George Crook as a viable target and sought to engage Crook’s army
encamped near Kernstown, Virginia.144
On July 24, Early rapidly marched his entire army down the Valley toward
Crook’s force. Here Early demonstrated a high degree of competence and tactical
acumen as he swiftly moved his large force approximately thirteen miles.145 He did not
make the same mistake of allowing his army to become dispersed, as he had in his march
from Monocacy to Washington. It should be noted that Early’s march from Fisher’s Hill
to Kernstown was not constrained by the same variables as his traverse from Monocacy.
Unlike the march to D.C., attrition in the form of casualties and general disorganization
did not hamper the movement to Kernstown, and this allowed Early to arrive with his
entire army on the battlefield rather than engaging the Union piecemeal as he had done at
Fort Stevens.146
Once at Kernstown, Early utilized the local topography to his advantage. The
Confederates formed a large battle line anchored by Major General John B. Gordon’s
infantry division. The Confederate left was comprised of Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s
division, which Early had wisely anchored on a series of rough hills that acted as a
natural barrier to Union flanking attempts. In his memoir Early indicates the tactical

144

“Kernstown, Second,” CWSAC Battle Summaries: The American Battlefield Protection Program
National Park Service, accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va116.htm
145

146

Report of Hayes, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 311

Crook, George. General George Crook: His Autobiography. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1946), 250

57
importance of anchoring his left on these topographical undulations so as to prevent a
Federal flanking maneuver. Early explains that this action may have saved the day and
ensured a southern victory as the Union was unable to compromise the Confederate left.
Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton’s division made up Early’s right flank.147 The size of
the Confederate force was still unknown to Crook and he was uncertain whether Early’s
entire army was in fact present on the battlefield. Early masterfully dispatched a
contingent of skirmishers to draw Crook’s force toward the Confederate line.
Miscommunication within the Federal chain of command resulted in a disorganized
attack and the well-positioned Confederate line repulsed various halfhearted Federal
assaults.148 Finally, during a Federal attack by Brigadier General James Mulligan’s
division, the Confederates discerned a weakness in the approaching Union line. John
Gordon’s division immediately exploited a gap in Mulligan’s battle line and charged
through the void. This action broke the advancing Union line and forced each Federal
unit into headlong retreat.149
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Of the 13,000 Confederates present at Kernstown, Early suffered approximately
500 dead, wounded, or missing. The 9,000 troops under Crook had significantly heavier
casualties of about 1,300. What would come to be known as the Second Battle of
Kernstown is an excellent example of how Early implemented conservative offensive
tactics that did not put his force at unnecessary risk. Rather than attack Crook’s position,
Early raced his army up to Kernstown then enticed the enemy to attack the Confederate
position on ground of Early’s choosing. The use of Confederate skirmishers to invite a
Union advance worked splendidly and is an excellent example of a conservative assault

150

Second Battle of Kernstown Civil War Map
Map,, Kernstown Battlefield, Thomas Legion, Kernstown, VA.
Accessed December 12, 2015.
http://thomaslegion.net/second_battle_of_kernstown_virginia_civil_war_battlefield_map.ht
http://thomaslegion.net/second_battle_of_kernstown_virginia_civil_war_battlefield_map.html

59
that limited potential losses.151 Furthermore, it should be noted that Early’s decision to
anchor his flank on a topographical feature saved his line from a Union flanking
maneuver. In addition to these successful decisions, it must be reiterated how effectively
Early was able to move his army thirteen miles so quickly and without the disbursement
of his force.152
Early took this Union defeat as an opportunity to press his advance north and
operate as a raiding force in Union-held territory. Even as he began his retreat back into
the Shenandoah Valley, Early dispatched two cavalry divisions under Brigadier General
John McCausland to raid points north in Pennsylvania and Maryland. The Confederate
cavalry made good use of the Federal retreat at Second Kernstown and capitalized on the
unprotected town of Chambersburg. Following the town’s inability to pay a $500,000
ransom demand, the Confederates burned the city, which garnered the attention of
northern newspapers and politicians.153 Following the razing of the Chambersburg town
center, the Confederate raiding party continued to disrupt Union communication and
transport lines until finally returning to the remainder of Early’s army in mid-August.154
July to August 1864 was a dynamic and bloody time for both the Union and
Confederate units operating in and around the Shenandoah Valley. Early had exploited
numerous opportunities to strike at the Federals and succeeded both in disrupting Union
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activity north of the Shenandoah Valley as well threatening Washington D.C. The result
of Early’s action was exactly what Lee had desired and instructed in his orders. Early’s
disruption north of the Potomac River garnered the attention of Grant and others so as to
warrant that a contingent of the forces laying siege to Petersburg be dispatched to address
the Confederate threat.
It is clear, given an analysis of the major clashes during this campaign that an
inextricable interplay between tactics and numerical disparities as a result of attrition
most certainly exists. It is necessary to acknowledge that in many instances the two are
determinative factors in the outcome of battles during this campaign. The intent of this
analysis is not to oversimplify but to elucidate the causal relationship between tactics and
attrition. It is clear that divorcing the role of tactics or attrition from a comprehensive
understanding of this campaign is impossible.
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Chapter Three: Sheridan’s Valley Campaign
Feelings of desperation became increasingly prevalent as the noose tightened
around the besieged Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in the region around
Richmond. The southern army under Robert E. Lee had been defending the Confederate
capital and was struggling to maintain control of the city. In June, Lee had hoped to
alleviate the pressure on the Confederate defenses as he dispatched Jubal Early’s corps
into the Shenandoah Valley. Despite some mistakes, Early had successfully disrupted
Union operations in northwestern Virginia and had created quite a panic when his force
threatened the defensive ring around Washington D.C. The victory at Monocacy and the
burning of Chambersburg also garnered further attention from the Union high command,
but they failed to relieve the pressure on Lee.155
The threat of a Confederate attack on Washington spurred Ulysses S. Grant to
dispatch reinforcements from Petersburg to bolster defenses around the city. Although
Washington was successfully defended, Early’s army was recognized as a serious threat
and Grant wished to address northern concerns by swiftly neutralizing Early’s force. It is
important to note that Grant’s decision to dispatch one of his most competent generals
directly correlated to Early’s successes in the previous months. Early’s fulfillment of
Lee’s directive to disrupt Union operations forced Grant to take the threat seriously and
thus led to Early’s ultimate demise.156 Confederate victories and the burning of
Chambersburg motivated a more concerted Federal response, which spurred a meeting
between Ulysses S. Grant and Abraham Lincoln at Fort Monroe on July 31, 1864. They
sought to shut down Confederate operations in the Shenandoah Valley and eliminate the
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ability for Early to continue his raids.157 The New York Times began to refer to the
Shenandoah Valley as the “back door” by which the Confederacy had repeatedly struck
the Union.158 In an effort to shut this “back door,” Lincoln and Grant agreed to dispatch
Phillip Sheridan and a large army to destroy Early’s force. Lincoln remarked in a
dispatch to Grant that he sincerely approved of Sheridan being given command of the
region and stated, “I have seen your dispatch in which you say, ‘I want Sheridan put in
command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy,
and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.’ This, I
think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move.”159 By August 8 Sheridan had
arrived in the Harpers Ferry along with his force of approximately 50,000 troops.160
Sheridan’s large force was different from the Union armies that Early encountered
in the previous months. For instance, the Union force under Lew Wallace at Monocacy
was ill equipped to challenge Early’s larger army. Furthermore, many units that the
Confederates encountered were much smaller than the southern force and therefore
operated in a reactionary fashion as they attempted to defend against Early’s marauding
contingent. Sheridan’s army, however, was specifically tasked with addressing the
Confederate army operating in the Shenandoah Valley and preventing it from effectively
continuing operations in the region. Although Early’s actions had resulted in a
realignment of Union forces, it quickly became evident to Lee that he would be required
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to bolster Early so that the Army of the Valley could viably challenge Sheridan’s new
task force. Lee dispatched three brigades to reinforce Early’s army, thus setting the stage
for the first clash of what would become known as Sheridan’s Valley Campaign.161
By August 16, 1864, elements of the reinforcements that Lee had sent from
Petersburg had spread out in their march to join Early. As Confederate Brigadier General
William Wofford’s brigade made its way through the small river town of Front Royal
Virginia, it encountered a much larger Union contingent comprised of three brigades.
Two of these brigades consisted of infantry units while one was Federal cavalry.162
Wofford’s brigade had become detached from the remainder of the Confederate force
sent from Petersburg and was subsequently operating independently without the ability to
rely on reinforcements if a precarious situation arose. This dispersion of troops was a
serious mistake as it limited the potential for the Confederates to gain numerical
superiority over an opposing force.
Upon encountering a Union picket line directly north of Front Royal, the
Confederates immediately gave chase rather than attempting to gauge the size of the
Union force. Furthermore, the Confederates avidly pursued the Federal sentries instead
of attempting to determine the exact position of the main Federal force.163 The failure of
the Confederates to successfully acquire vitally important intelligence represents a
tactical error as it set the southerners up for a surprise counter assault. As the southerners
pursued the fleeing Union pickets, they became dispersed and their lines progressively
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thinned as they crossed various topographic obstacles.164 The terrain north of Front
Royal possesses many natural obstacles such as hills, ravines, and water crossings that
made the maneuvering of troops quite difficult. Further, there existed few bridges or
fords where the Shenandoah River and various tributaries could be crossed. This made
the movements of the advancing Confederates quite predictable to the Federals and they
quickly prepared to repulse the southern threat.165
Despite the adverse terrain, the Confederates continued their pursuit and were
quickly situated at the base of a steep prominent feature known as Guard Hill. Union
Brigadier General Thomas C. Devin’s cavalry had positioned themselves along the base
of the strong point and the Confederates did not possess the numerical strength to
perform a frontal assault on the Union position.166 The Confederate commanders erred
when they permitted their assault to become diluted due to the chaos of battle and the
rough terrain. Rather than regrouping, the Confederates attempted a flanking maneuver
that required wading across Crooked Run, a chest high stream that runs along the base of
Guard Hill.167 Here the Confederates made yet another tactical error, as they did not gain
enough intelligence before committing their force to a flanking maneuver over unknown
territory.168
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Wofford ordered his troops through the stream but upon reaching the other side,
they were immediately counterattacked by two brigades of Federal infantry. At this point
the Confederates were outnumbered nearly three to one and did not possess the combat
power to challenge the Union brigades. The Confederates were now trapped between the
advancing Federals and Crooked Run as they attempted to funnel back across the creek.
Had the Confederates probed the Union position more extensively they may have realized
the presence of the two additional infantry brigades.169 The failure to perform necessary
reconnaissance put the Confederates at a greater disadvantage, as they were unprepared
for the Federal assault.170 There is no excuse for Wofford’s mistake, as he should have
known the tactical implications of trapping himself on the enemy side of a waterway. As
the Federal infantry brigades advanced many southern units were enveloped and
captured. As the remainder of Wofford’s force attempted to escape, Union Brigadier
General George Custer arrived on the field with reinforcements further accentuating the
numerical disparity between the two armies. The Confederates were forced into
headlong retreat as they were now severely outnumbered.171
Although the majority of Wofford’s force escaped the Union counterattack,
approximately 500 were captured or killed. Confederate losses were in fact quite high
when compared to roughly 100 Union casualties. This clash is an excellent example of
how numerical disparities, as a result of dilution and attrition, combined with tactical
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errors resulted in a disastrous situation for the Confederates.172 The dispersing of troops
on the way to the Shenandoah Valley from Petersburg set Wofford’s brigade up for a
scenario where they would not be able to capitalize on an opportunity due to the lack of
manpower. The engagement at Guard Hill is a superb example of the relationship
between the effects of attrition and battlefield tactics as the southerners committed a
series of grave errors that prevented them from accurately ascertaining the enemy’s
strength and position, thus resulting in heavy losses.173
Despite the heavy southern casualties, this engagement had little effect on the
overall campaign as the Confederates resumed their march toward the remainder of Jubal
Early’s army. Five days after the battle at Guard Hill, the two armies once again clashed
at what is now Summit Point, West Virginia. On August 21, 1864, Early devised a plan
to strike at Sheridan’s army encamped around Charles Town, West Virginia. Early
ordered an elaborate flanking attack and split his force into two wings. Early would
command one wing while he ceded control of the other to Major General Richard H.
Anderson.174 Early hoped to flank either side of the Union position outside of Charles
Town and converge with the two segments of his force simultaneously on either side of
the Federals.175
Early’s tactic relied on a well-synchronized movement of units to maximize the
number of available troops for combat. The Confederate maneuvering targeted a small
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portion of Sheridan’s force to ensure that the southerners would have a numerical
advantage. This flanking endeavor represents a sound tactical decision as it mitigated the
Confederate deficiencies in manpower. Furthermore, Early was tasked with orchestrating
an array of moving parts that made his tactical equation quite complex. The Federals,
however, enjoyed the benefit of a defensive position that did not require them to
coordinate elaborate troop movements.
The initial Confederate attack was relatively successful as it surprised a segment
of Sheridan’s force; however, after initial contact, the Confederate onslaught stalled as
the Federals quickly countered the southern attack with a series of controlled retreats that
were designed to delay the southern advance. Major General James Wilson’s cavalry
division quickly repulsed Anderson’s column. Wilson’s division effectively screened the
Federal withdrawal rendering Anderson’s assault ineffective. Early’s wing met
resistance from elements of the VI Corps that replicated Wilson’s screening maneuvers.
Together the Federals progressively disengaged with the Confederate attackers in an
attempt to prematurely conclude the engagement. Rather than pressing the advance, Early
opted for a cautious approach that would limit potential losses. While the Federals
continued their delaying actions, Early was wise not to commit the majority of his troops
and by the evening of August 21, neither of the armies had suffered significant casualties.
By the following morning, the engagement was concluded when Sheridan’s force moved
approximately three miles east to the small hamlet of Halltown, West Virginia.176
Despite the inconclusive result of this clash, Early did avoid heavy casualties by
operating in a fashion that avoided putting his army at undue risk. The Confederate’s
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initial plan relied on isolating a smaller portion of Sheridan’s larger force thus balancing
the numerical scale in the favor of the southerners. Although this maneuvering did not
yield the results that Early had initially desired he did not make a poor situation into a
disastrous one. Early could have pressed his attack on the evening of August 21 as the
Federals drew the southerners closer to the main body of Sheridan’s army. This would
have placed Early’s force in a precarious position, as the Confederates would be in
danger of being enveloped by the numerically superior Union army.177 In this regard,
Early demonstrated sound tactical decision-making as he limited the potential for defeat
and attrition. By the end of the day, the Confederates suffered only 500 casualties, while
the Federals sustained approximately 700 losses. These low casualties are further
evidence that both armies sought to avoid the pernicious effects of attrition and preserve
their fighting forces.178
On August 28, Early’s force encountered a cavalry division at Smithfield
Crossing under the command of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt. The Confederates
promptly pushed the Union troopers north until Federal reinforcements arrived which
inhibited the Confederate assault.179 Here again, Early broke off the attack when Union
reinforcements deprived the southerners of the numerical advantage. Following the
action at Smithfield Crossing, Early moved the remainder of his force south to
Winchester, Virginia.180 Sheridan promptly followed Early south and positioned his
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army approximately 3 miles west of the Confederates. Seeing an opportunity to strike at
Sheridan’s force, Early dispatched Major General Joseph Kershaw’s division to test the
Federal position and determine the strength and location of Sheridan’s units. Rather than
committing his entire force to an uncertain situation, the Confederate commander opted
for a more cautious approach that only risked one of his divisions. This lowered the
potential for heavy casualties as it kept the majority of Early’s army out of the fight.181
On the evening of September 3 at around 4:30 P.M. Kershaw assaulted Joseph
Thoburn’s division of the VIII Corps situated directly west of the Federal force. The
decision to initiate the attack so late in the day was problematic as it limited the
opportunity for the Confederates to exploit any weaknesses in the Union line before
nightfall. Nonetheless, Kershaw’s Division moved forward and engaged in heavy
skirmishing for the next few hours.182 Here, Kershaw exhibited sound tactical reasoning,
as he simply maintained sporadic contact with the enemy but did not initiate a full-scale
assault, as he did not possess the troop strength to break the Union line without incurring
heavy casualties of his own. Once again, numerical strength and the prospect of
casualties were dictating the tactics of Early’s army. Realizing the need to achieve
numerical supremacy both sides quickly rushed in reinforcements; however, this
achieved very little as nightfall forced a premature end to the fighting. Early’s decision
to bolster Kershaw’s division was instrumental in avoiding a Confederate defeat as
Kershaw’s unit had suffered over 300 casualties and was in danger of being severely
outnumbered when further Union reinforcements arrived. It is clear that Early’s decision,
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motivated by an aversion to attrition, leveled the playing field and prevented a potentially
disastrous situation.183
On the morning of September 4, both sides had heavily reinforced their lines and
the Federals occupied a well-fortified defensive position with extensive earthworks. The
topography in this region is wrought with steep undulations and interconnected ravines,
which limited the avenues of approach for a Confederate attack.184 These topographical
constraints along with the numerical superiority of Sheridan’s force made the prospect of
a southern assault quite precarious.185 Maps produced by Early’s chief cartographer
Jedediah Hotchkiss indicate that any Confederate advance would be funneled into narrow
avenues of attack, which would make the approaching southern lines easy targets for
Union artillery. Early avoided this costly endeavor and withdrew his army thus
concluding what would become known as the Battle of Berryville.
The relationship between tactics and the prospect of casualties and other forms of
attrition is readily apparent in the opening stages of Sheridan’s Valley Campaign. The
cautious sparring of both armies directly resulted in relatively insignificant overall
casualties. The clash at Berryville is a superb example of the correlation between
cautious well-implemented tactics and low rates of attrition as neither side suffered over
400 casualties in this engagement.186
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directive of disrupting Union operations. Aside from the razing of Chambersburg, little
had been done to warrant the presence of Sheridan’s army of 50,000 men. Early’s
relatively unobtrusive movements can, to some extent, be attributed to the increased
Union presence in the region as Sheridan’s powerful force severely inhibited Confederate
operations. Following the Battle of Berryville, Early wished to replicate his successful
raiding missions from earlier in the year and sought to take an expeditionary force north
and strike at the Union railroad network. Despite the proximity of Sheridan’s force, the
Confederate commander sought to strike at the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad hub located in
what is now Martinsburg, West Virginia.188 In order to do this, Early would need to
move elements of his army north from Winchester in order to stage a successful raid
against the Union depot. This would require Early to discreetly maneuver his army north
without alerting Sheridan of his intent to raid West Virginia. Although Early wished to
covertly reach Martinsburg, his movements were hindered in several important ways.189
The primary route that a large army could use from Winchester to the B&O was the
Valley Pike, which was adequate for the movement of artillery and ancillary wagons.
Although this road was ideal for rapidly moving an army, it was the only viable route that
a force of Early’s size could use to travel up and down the Valley. This meant that
movement was relatively predictable and Sheridan’s pickets could rapidly discern Early’s
intent to strike north.190
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Despite the predictability of Early’s movements, he opted to move approximately
19,000 men up the Valley Pike on September 19, 1864. In their journey to reach the
B&O, the Confederate column began to spread out along the road. It is unclear exactly
why this was permitted to happen, but it proved to be a fatal mistake. It is difficult to
ascertain if Early intended for the dispersing of his troops in order to protect his supply
lines and avenue of retreat. The proximity of Sheridan’s much larger force of 50,000
men may have spurred Early to protect his supply lines by leaving units to act as pickets
in the event of a Federal advance. The second explanation for the dispersing of Early’s
corps is a simple inability to keep his force together over the long march. Perhaps Early
did not emphasize the importance of concentrating his units to his lieutenants, which
subsequently resulted in the thinning of his force. This was Early’s first tactical error of
what would become known as the Third Battle of Winchester. The dilution of Early’s
force reduced the combat effectiveness of his army as no single unit was adequately
supported to exploit opportunities or defend against attacks. This mistake is quite similar
to Early’s error during his march from Monocacy Junction to Washington D.C. where he
also permitted the thinning of his army.191 Grant, in his memoirs, “Early had invited this
attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy.” Grant went on to state,
“But his forces were separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell
back to Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan following.”192 Even Grant, years later, recognized Early’s
error of permitting his force to thin out in their raiding mission.
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Early’s significantly smaller and diluted contingent was an easy target for
Sheridan, and the Federals quickly mobilized to strike at the vulnerable Confederate
column. Sheridan’s army camped around Berryville raced toward the rear portion of
Early’s force just north of Winchester at Stephenson’s Depot.193 Sheridan indicated in
his memoirs, “he promptly proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within
supporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryville pike about two miles
east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run.” This is clear evidence
that Sheridan recognized the implications of Early spreading out his army and
demonstrates Sheridan’s ability to discern weaknesses in his opponent. Despite
Sheridan’s intent of surprising the Confederates, the topography between Berryville and
Winchester was not conducive to the rapid movement of Sheridan’s force and the
Federals quickly became clogged in the steep ravines, which acted as bottlenecks.
Sheridan should have realized the topographical constraints of his intended route, which
severely inhibited his approach. This tactical error gave Early the necessary time to
reconnoiter and move the remainder of his raiding force south to meet the Federal
assault.194
Early, however, made a fatal error almost as soon as elements of Sheridan’s force
made contact with his column. Early opted to fight at Winchester, however, prior to the
clash the majority of Early’s army was on the Valley Pike and enjoyed relative ease of
movement. Early should have retained his force and continued to move south,
disengaging from Sheridan’s surprise attack all together and allowing Early to select
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better ground further south. If Early had retreated south he may have been able to defend
positions around Fisher’s Hill or Front Royal where the topography was more favorable.
However, it is plausible that after weeks of sparring both commanders desired an
opportunity to crush their opponents in a full-fledged encounter. It is also possible that
Early did not realize Sheridan had over 40,000 men at his disposal and the Confederate
commander simply underestimated the severity of the Federal threat. Prior to this
engagement Early had only encountered smaller elements of Sheridan’s force and he may
have erroneously assumed he was once again engaging only a segment of the Sheridan’s
army.195
The Confederates were, however, able to marshal a substantial number of their
troops to meet the oncoming Federal attack, but many Confederate units were still spread
out in their march back toward Winchester. Early highlighted the dilution of his force in
his memoirs by pointing out that Gordon did not arrive on the field until approximately
10:00 A.M. and his late arrival contributed to the overall chaos of trying to organize a
cohesive Confederate defense. Here Early’s late decision to consolidate his force began
to cause problems as the Confederates were severely outnumbered and desperately
needed reinforcements.196 If Early had concentrated his force to begin with, he would
have had all available troops to quell Sheridan’s frontal assault. Gordon pointed out
Early’s mistake in his memoirs by stating, “The reports of the Federal approach,
however, did not seem to impress General Early, and he delayed the order for
concentration until Sheridan was upon him, ready to devour him piecemeal, a division at
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a time.”197 In his memoir, Early lamented the Confederate numerical inferiority when he
stated, “It was a moment of imminent and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for
Ramseur’s division, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to withstand the
immense force advancing against it.”198 Here a combination of Early’s piecemeal tactics
and Sheridan’s overwhelming force began to create conditions for a potential
Confederate defeat.199
Despite this crisis, the Confederates hurriedly constructed breastworks and
utilized the terrain to their benefit. Early anchored his right flank atop a series of hills,
which presented an imposing obstacle for the Federals.200 Early’s effective use of
topography helped mitigate the Confederate deficiencies in manpower and offered his
troops increased protection from enemy fire. His decision to hold these hills was a
superb tactical maneuver as it severely inhibited Sheridan’s routes of advance.
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201

Although the Confederate right was well positioned
positioned, their center was left in a
vulnerable state. The southern center consisted of one infantry division under Major
General John B. Gordon. Gordon’s division benefitted from little protection such as
breastworks and trenches. Behind Gordon’s battle line wass a small patch of woods that
made it difficult for Confederate artillery on the other side to observe and cover Gordon’s
position. Although Gordon’s men could readily engage an approaching Federal attack,
they were unable to benefit from artillery suppor
support.202 Subsequently, Gordon’s infantry
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enjoyed no tactical supremacy by occupying this position. This disorganization was a
costly tactical mistake as it left Gordon’s infantry unsupported.

Following a frontal

assault by Major General William Emory’s XIX Corps, Gordon’s line began to crumble
into retreat.203 This blunder resulted in heavy casualties as the numerically superior
Federals overran the Confederate center. The Union advance was only blunted when it
reached the Confederate artillery on the other side of the woods, which forced a
temporary Federal withdrawal.204 If Gordon had positioned his infantry alongside the
artillery, they may have benefitted from the southern cannons and subsequently suffered
fewer casualties, as it is doubtful the Federal assault would have been within rifle range
of Gordon’s troops.
The failed attempt to break the Confederate center spurred Sheridan to flank the
southern line and he quickly dispatched VI and XIX Corps to assault opposing ends of
Early’s position. As the Union battle line separated into two isolated contingents,
forming a gap, Early ordered a counterassault into the void. Although this tactic may
have worked in other circumstances, the Confederates suffered from heavy casualties and
the counter attack quickly stalled.205 This attempt represented yet another costly tactical
error by Early as the Confederates did not possess the numerical strength to take full
advantage of such a maneuver and subsequently sustained heavy casualties.206 Early
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alludes to his mistake of allowing his force to join the battle in piecemeal fashion in his
memoirs when he remarks, “Had I then had a fresh body of troops to push our victory,
the day would have been ours, but in this action, in the early part of the day, I had present
only about 7,000 muskets, about 2,000 cavalry and two battalions of artillery with about
30 guns; and they had all been engaged.”207 Gordon commented in his memoir, “This
left practically only Rodes's division and mine, with parts of Ramseur's bleeding
brigades, not more than 6000 men in all, to contend with Sheridan's whole army of about
30,000 men, reaching in both directions far beyond our exposed right and left.”208
Gordon’s comments indicate a tone of despair at the severe numerical discrepancies.
Attrition among high-ranking Confederate officers also contributed to the general
confusion and compromised the effectiveness of Early’s force. Early went on to recount
“But on our side, Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph,
while conducting the attack of his division with great gallantry and skill, and this was a
heavy blow to me. Brigadier General Godwin of Ramseur's division had been killed, and
Brigadier General York of Gordon's division had lost an arm. Other brave men and
officers had fallen, and we could illy bear the loss of any of them.”209
Earlier in the day, the southern right had held against Federal assaults but
Sheridan devised a plan to outflank the southern stronghold rendering the breastworks
and emplacements useless. Brigadier General James Wilson took a brigade of cavalry
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around the far left of the Confederate position in an attempt to get behind Early’s line.210
In this moment, the effects of casualties and numerical deficiencies manifested
themselves and inhibited Confederate attempts to extend their line. The southerners were
unable to marshal enough troops to sufficiently lengthen their flanks and the Union
cavalry forced a collapse of the entire Confederate position. Lemuel Abijah Abbott of
Sheridan’s army indicated in his account of the battle the numerical deficiencies of
Early’s force. He explained that despite the chaos and confusion of the fight he noticed
that the Confederate battle line was very sparse. He articulated how the Confederate line
was visibly thin and could not hold out against a Federal assault.211 Early stated “The
enemy's cavalry force, however, was too large for us, and having the advantage of open
ground, it again succeeded in getting around our left, producing great confusion, for
which there was no remedy. Nothing now was left for us but to retire through
Winchester.”212
Although Sheridan initiated the attack, Early had chosen the exact location of the
battle as he deployed his troops along the heights to the east of Winchester. Early’s
selection of ground was problematic as it ultimately inhibited his path of retreat. Early
relied on a series of bottlenecks through which his army would need to pass if a
withdrawal was necessary. This mistake had costly consequences as the retreating
Confederates funneled into the steep ravines between the battlefield and Winchester. The
Confederates were attempting to reach the Valley Pike, but the topography hampered
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their egress and gave the pursuing Federals an opportunity to continue their assault.213
This action inflicted further casualties on the battered Confederates as they attempted to
flee the Union pursuers. Here Early’s failure to adequately assess the ground and viable
routes of escape directly affected rates of attrition. Finally, elements of Early’s Corps
reached the Valley Pike where they began their exodus south. Although evening was
beginning to set in, the pursuing Federals did not call off their pursuit and cavalry units
continued to harass the retreating southern column. The Confederates made little effort
to screen their retreat, which made them vulnerable to sporadic fire as the Federals
paralleled the Pike.214 Finally, the Confederates enjoyed a break in the action when night
fell, making it increasingly difficult for the Federals to continue their harassing attacks.
Gordon recounted Sheridan’s chase, “The pursuit was pressed far into the twilight, and
only ended when night came and dropped her protecting curtains around us.”215
The fighting concluded the night of September 19 and after hours of combat, the
Confederates finally broke contact with the enemy. In what would become known as the
Third Battle of Winchester the Confederates mobilized approximately 11,500 troops and
suffered nearly 3,800 casualties. Sheridan’s force was substantially larger and consisted
of over 42,000 men with no more than 5,000 dead, wounded, or missing.216 Given these
statistics, the southerners suffered substantially higher casualty rates than their opponents,
which would profoundly affect the remainder of the campaign. However, Sheridan’s
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force did suffer relatively high losses the majority of which came from the bloody frontal
assaults on the Confederate left. Despite these casualties this brazen and direct tactic
achieved the intended result, but at a costly price. Despite Federal losses Lincoln was
well pleased with Sheridan’s results and in a dispatch to him stated, “Have just heard of
your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and
see you.”217
In addition to casualties, the Confederates suffered from other forms of attrition as
the shattered army was now disorganized and units were spread out along the Valley
Pike. This disorganization led to further confusion, which dramatically worsened the
Confederate situation. By September 21, the Confederate retreat was halted and Early
found what he perceived to be a defensible position approximately one mile south of
Strasburg, Virginia. Early deployed his army into defensive positions and attempted to
reorganize his depleted force. The arduous march from Winchester severely dispersed
his army at a time when he desperately needed every available man. The tactical
implications of a disorganized fighting force became increasingly evident as Early
attempted to orchestrate a defense of Fisher’s Hill.218
Sheridan’s victory did not preclude his force from suffering from disorganization
and general attrition either. Following the Third Battle of Winchester, the Federals were
plagued with similar resource-draining operations such as tending to the injured and
reorganizing after a large-scale battle. Of the roughly 42,000 Federals that fought at
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Winchester, only about 30,000 made their way south to meet Early’s army. The
Confederates were in a much more precarious position as they were able to muster no
more than 10,000 troops for their defense. In many respects the action that was to take
place near Fisher’s Hill was inextricably linked to the engagement at Winchester as
casualties suffered there directly affected the following day’s tactics.219
To adequately understand how casualties affected the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, it is
imperative to grasp the topographical constraints of the region. The Shenandoah Valley
is bracketed by steep mountains on either side and these separate ranges taper
progressively closer at the northernmost part of the region. The Blue Ridge Mountains
spanned the length of the Valley to the east and terminate at Strasburg. To the west, the
Allegheny Mountains define the Shenandoah and a series of knurled foothills around
Fisher’s Hill flank the east side. Massanutten Mountain, an offshoot of the Blue Ridge,
runs down the center of the Valley, further constricting movement. Here the Shenandoah
Valley is no more than 3 miles wide and is wrought with dynamic topographical
undulations, which made the maneuvering of troops quite complex. In addition to the
steep mountain ranges, the Shenandoah River also weaves through the Valley at this
point, further inhibiting the placement of troops.220
If travelling south along the Valley Pike, there are a series of protruding bluffs at
Fisher’s Hill that would present an imposing obstacle if adequately manned. These bluffs
stretch from Massanutten Mountain west for approximately 2.5 miles and taper off just
short of the Allegheny Mountain range. Given the height and length of these bluffs,
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Early perceived them to be an adequate defensive position and deployed his troops along
the low ridge. Early reasoned to Lee that Fisher’s Hill “was the only place where a stand
could be made.”221 The Confederates were severely outnumbered, but sought to mitigate
their numerical deficiencies with a strong defensive position.
Early deployed Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton’s division on the Confederate
right flank and anchored Wharton’s troops tightly up against the steep base of
Massanutten Mountain. This prevented a Federal flanking maneuver around the
Confederate right, as the steep slope of the mountain did not lend itself to the movement
of troops. This was a sound tactical decision that drastically limited the avenues of attack
on the Confederate position. This preventative measure further limited the potential for
southern casualties as it made a Federal assault from that direction almost impossible.222
The Confederate center was occupied by Major General John Gordon’s division,
which formed a small salient atop the bluffs. Gordon’s center was a formidable
emplacement as it sat atop the highest portion of bluffs and had a good field of fire as a
long field sloped down toward the base of these hills. This made the prospect of a frontal
assault by Sheridan’s force quite daunting, as any attacking battle line would be exposed
to heavy rifle and artillery fire. To the west of Gordon’s position was Major General
Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s division, which comprised the left flank of Early’s entire
force.223 Ramseur’s unit was the weakest point of the Confederate defense for two
primary reasons. First, Ramseur’s portion of the line did not benefit from the landscape
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as the bluffs flattened out into a low point in the center of Ramseur’s position. This
meant that the Confederates had no tactical benefits such as cover or hills to repulse a
Federal assault there. Second, the left flank was not anchored on any geographic
strongpoint such as a mountain or a body of water. Ramseur’s force was simply left
floating a half-mile short of Little North Mountain, a segment of the Allegheny range.
Early admitted to this tactical deficiency in his memoirs and explained that Ramseur’s
portion of the defense “could not then be fully occupied.”224
Ramseur’s poor position was the manifestation of a tactical error due to
numerical deficiencies caused by casualties and other forms of attrition from previous
battles. The Confederates were outnumbered nearly 3 to 1 and simply did not possess the
manpower to span the critical half mile gap to the base of Little North Mountain.225 This
left the entire line in a precarious position as a Federal flanking attempt around the
Confederate left could succeed thus compromising the entire southern line. Early
committed a grave tactical error when he failed to recognize the profound implications of
his numerical inferiority, and did not adjust his tactics to accommodate for his now
smaller force. It stands to reason that if Early had not accumulated such heavy casualties
at Third Winchester, he may have had the troop strength to span the entire three miles,
thus eliminating the probability of a successful Union flanking maneuver.226
Sheridan quickly discerned the weakness in the Confederate position and
capitalized on Early’s tactical error. The Union commander ordered a frontal assault on
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the Confederate center, which required the Federals to cross the deadly open field
opposite of Gordon’s division. This frontal assault was quite risky, as it may have
resulted in heavy Federal casualties; however, Sheridan’s superior numbers gave him a
degree of flexibility so that he was not limited to the use of conservative maneuvers.
Furthermore, Sheridan’s frontal assault was designed to hold Early’s center in place and
prevent the Confederates from realigning their troops to support their weak left flank.227
Even Sheridan recognized that a frontal assault by itself would not expel the
Confederates from their position as he states in his memoirs, “A reconnaissance made
pending these movements convinced me that the enemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so
strong that a direct assault would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be
of doubtful result.”228 However Sheridan did not rely solely on his frontal attack as this
movement would be accompanied by the main thrust of the Federal attack, which
consisted of an elaborate flanking maneuver designed to envelope the vulnerable
Confederate left. By late afternoon, Sheridan initiated his bold assault on Early’s
beleaguered force. At approximately 4:30 P.M. on September 22, Major General Horatio
Wright’s VI Corps stepped off across the long sloping field to reach the Confederate
center. An eruption of heavy artillery and rifle fire ensued as the Confederates hoped to
blunt the Federal charge.229 Simultaneously, Major General George Crook’s VIII Corps
wheeled around the Confederate left and successfully reached the end of the southern
line. Either one of these Federal assaults may have individually been repulsed but in
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conjunction with one another, they began to overwhelm the outnumbered southerners.230
Fierce fighting ensued at the Confederate center and Gordon’s division began to give
ground. However, it was not until Crook’s Corps made contact with Ramseur’s division
that the entire southern line began to collapse.231 Randolph Harrison Mckim, an enlisted
soldier in the Confederate army, articulated in his memoir, the importance of Early’s
numerical deficiencies at Fisher’s Hill. He indicated that the sparsely manned
Confederate position was readily shattered and pushed from their trenches.232 Higher
level reports echo these sentiments. Gordon commented somewhat sharply on the events:
“Our stay was short, however, and our leaving was hurried, without ceremony or concert.
It is the old story of failure to protect flanks.”233
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Ramseur attempted to extend his line
line, but lacked the manpower to sufficiently
prevent the Federals from out flanking his position. Once the Federals reached the rear of
Ramseur’s force, the entire Confederate army began to fall into confusion and began to
frantically retreat once again down the Valley Pike.235 Early did well not to repeat his
mistake from Third Winchester when he failed to account for an easy route of escape. At
Fisher’s Hill, Early preserved his avenue of retreat and, despite the chaos of defeat, was
able to funnel the majority of his troops to the Valley Pike and out of danger. Although
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Early saved many of his troops, he was unable to extricate much of his equipment and
artillery, which Sheridan’s army captured.236
Sheridan erred by initiating his attack so late in the day as the setting sun spelled
the end of the battle and a lost opportunity to thoroughly destroy Early’s force. Despite
this error, Sheridan’s plan had worked masterfully and the Confederates suffered a
second devastating defeat in four days. Gordon summed up the day’s events quite
succinctly when he stated in his memoirs, “The battle, or, to speak more accurately, the
bout at Fisher's Hill, was so quickly ended that it may be described in a few words.
Indeed, to all experienced soldiers, the whole story is told in one word—‘flanked.’"237
Grant, in his memoirs, recognized the feasibility of Early’s defense at Fisher’s Hill states
that Sheridan readily flanked the Confederates. Grant indicates a sense of pride in his
description of the battle when he comments, “The valley is narrow at that point, and
Early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. But Sheridan
turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot
pursuit.”238 Of the 30,000 Federals engaged at Fisher’s Hill, they suffered insignificant
casualties of less than 700. The Confederates, however, experienced a much higher
casualty rate of nearly 1,100. This is over 10 percent of the troops Early had available at
the onset of the battle.239 Fisher’s Hill stands as a powerful example of the relationship
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between tactical errors and attrition. It is also clear given the analysis that the
combination of these two errors directly contributed to Confederate defeat.
Early’s Confederates retreated up the Valley 75 miles towards Staunton and then
headed east eventually stopping at Waynesboro, Virginia. By retreating so far south,
Early left the entire northern valley vacant and open to Sheridan’s triumphant army.
Although Early had temporarily abandoned the northern portions of the Shenandoah
Valley, it was a sound strategic decision as his force had been worn down over the
preceding days and rendered relatively ineffective. If Early had attempted to engage
Sheridan again it could have been disastrous, as the Confederates had lost almost 8,000
men in the previous seven days to various forms of attrition. With these factors in mind,
Early’s conservative approach was appropriate so as to avoid further losses.240 Given the
relative security of Waynesboro it is apparent that Early may have been better off
directing his army there directly following the defeat at Winchester thus avoiding the
potential for a devastating defeat at Fisher’s Hill altogether.241
The Confederate retreat was not without consequence as Sheridan’s army slowly
followed the southerners eventually stopping on September 26 at Harrisonburg, Virginia.
This repositioning marked the beginning of a new phase of Sheridan’s campaign. The
crop production of the Shenandoah Valley had always been recognized as an important
strategic target for both sides during the conflict.242 Sheridan, in an effort to deprive the
Confederates of these important natural resources, devised a plan to permanently cripple
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the ability of the Shenandoah to supply the Confederate army. Grant had always
intended Sheridan’s force to perform such action as evidenced in his July 14, 1864 letter
to headquarters in Washington that an army should be created to “to eat out Virginia clear
and clean … so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry
their provender with them.”243 For approximately two weeks, Sheridan dispatched
cavalry units on a series of raids to raze and otherwise destroy the farmlands, mills, and
barns in the southern portion of the Valley. In this period, Federal cavalry systematically
burned large swaths of farmland and anything that could be of use to the enemy.244
The duration of Sheridan’s occupation in the southern Shenandoah Valley was
short lived as he soon directed his army north on the Valley Pike towards Winchester,
Virginia. During Early’s stay in Waynesboro, his force received desperately needed
reinforcements when Lee dispatched approximately three brigades to replenish some of
the losses Early received during the earlier portion of his campaign. Lee had reinforced
Early’s force so that he could resume his efforts to fulfill Lee’s directive of disrupting
Union operations along with protecting the resources in the Valley from Sheridan’s
marauding force. The Confederates slowly worked their way north cautiously following
Sheridan’s army. On October 9, Union Brigadier Generals Alfred Torbert and George
Custer halted their retreat up the valley and attempted to slow the advance of Early’s
pursuing force at Tom’s Brook.245 They clashed with Major General Thomas L. Rosser’s
cavalry and the superior numbers of the Federals allowed them to quickly route the
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southerners. To Early’s credit he avoided making this action into a full scale clash as he
desperately needed to preserve his fighting force for a more productive opportunity.
Following this relatively small clash, the Confederates resumed their pursuit of
Sheridan’s army and by October 12 reached their old positions around Fisher’s Hill.246
Although Fisher’s Hill was not a wise position to hold during the engagement there
weeks before, Early now possessed the troop strength to span the full 3 miles between
Massanutten Mountain and the Allegheny Mountains. This was a sound decision as he
could sufficiently anchor his line at the base of each mountain, thus eliminating the
probability of a flanking attack.247 Gordon, in his memoirs, referred to the position as
“unassailable” and that it could not be flanked as it was a month earlier. It should be
noted that occupying this position was only possible with sufficient numbers as Early
now had approximately 20,000 men at his disposal.248
Aside from the action at Tom’s Brook, Sheridan had little indication that the
Confederates were capable of mustering the necessary troops to strike at his larger army.
Following the extensive fighting in the previous month and the stunning victories at
Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, it is likely that Sheridan assumed Early’s army had been
neutralized, at least for the time being. Sheridan certainly suggested as much as he
ordered Major General Horatio G. Wright’s VI Corps back to the siege at Petersburg.
This realignment of troops would have further balanced the numerical scales by draining
Sheridan’s troop strength. However, the VI Corps’ return to Petersburg was halted when
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Early moved his army north from Fisher’s Hill.249 The Confederates marched three miles
north to the heights around Strasburg and rapidly moved their artillery into position atop
Hupp’s Hill. From here they began to shell the Union encampment around Cedar Creek
and Belle Grove, a prominent plantation.250 Early did a superb job of discretely moving
his army to the heights without alerting the Federals of his presence. This sound tactical
maneuver gave the southerners an opportunity to strike the Federals and inflict casualties
while not placing their own troops at significant risk.251 However, this initial success was
double edged as it alerted the Federals of the Confederates presence, which spurred
Sheridan to recall Wright’s Corps to reinforce the Union position. It is not clear why
Early decided to assault the Federals here, as he knew Sheridan had intended to send a
portion of his force back to Grant. In his memoirs, Early admits to knowing of
Sheridan’s decision to send a portion of his force back to Grant, but opts to assault the
Federal position anyway.252
Colonel Joseph Thoburn’s division formed up and assaulted the Confederate
artillery atop Hupp’s Hill and a fierce but abbreviated fight ensued. Neither side suffered
significant casualties, and the action was relatively inconclusive as night fell, ending the
day’s action. Early’s decision to attack before Wright’s Corps had left the vicinity was
most definitely a mistake. If Early had paused to gain more intelligence as to the
Federals’ precise movements, he would have realized that Wright’s departure would
dramatically benefit his prospects in the Valley. Early was operating in a region that had
249

Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, Page 88

250

Whitehorne, The Battle of Cedar Creek, Page 46-53

251

Hazlett, Field Artillery Weapons of the Civil War, Page 243

252

Jubal Anderson Early, Jubal Early’s Memoirs, Page 437-439

94
many Confederate sympathizers, which he certainly should have drawn upon to obtain
better intelligence.253
Despite the presence of Early’s army on October 16, Sheridan departed for
Washington leaving his force camped just south of Middletown, Virginia. Early,
unaware of Sheridan’s departure, engaged in a series of counterintelligence operations
with the intent of confusing the Federals. Early hoped that a show of overwhelming force
would prompt Sheridan to move his army north or out of the Valley completely. The
Confederates intentionally provided the Federals with misinformation when they
conspicuously signaled, by semaphore, that Early was expecting James Longstreet’s
Corps to reinforce him in the Shenandoah Valley.254 When news of this reached
Sheridan, he cancelled his journey to Washington and returned to his troops255 Grant, in
his memoirs, commented on Early’s blunder stating, “The next morning while at Front
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch from Longstreet
to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush
Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered
the cavalry up the valley to join Wright.”256 Here again Early’s endeavors backfired as
his attempt to intimidate the Federals with the prospect of Confederate reinforcements
merely solidified Sheridan’s resolve to remain in the Shenandoah. Given the tenacity and
effort that Sheridan had exhibited in the Valley, it is curious that Early would expect a
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tactic of this nature to scare Sheridan into leaving. Previous attempts by Early to make
his force appear larger than it actually was resulted in reinforcements being rushed to Fort
Stevens and ultimately Sheridan’s arrival in the Valley with 50,000 men. This past
evidence should have suggested to Early that his tactic would not achieve the desired
effect but rather the opposite. Previously, any show of Confederate force was swiftly
answered with Union reinforcements and a concerted effort to neutralize Early’s threat.
Early’s endeavor to trick his enemy proved to be yet another mistake that would have
profound consequences over the next few days.257
Although the Federals were now aware of Early’s presence, the Confederate
commander hatched a daring plan to surprise the encampments around Cedar Creek. The
Federals had, in their estimation, made good use of the local topography when they
organized their camps around the open fields directly south of Middletown. To the
Union right, a series of steep undulating slopes followed Cedar Creek northwest, which
made a southern attack from that direction impossible.258 The Shenandoah River, which
meandered along a series of steep banks, flanked the Federal left making a Confederate
incursion from that side quite unlikely.259
The Union position, however, was not entirely impenetrable, as a little known
route around the Federal’s left flank did in fact exist.260 With the help of some locals and
chief cartographer Jedediah Hotchkiss, Early was made aware of two shallow fords
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approximately one mile east of Strasburg along the North Fork of the Shenandoah. Early
sought to utilize the fords by covertly moving a segment of his army across the
Shenandoah River to strike at the unsuspecting northerners on the other side. Gordon
commented on the daring maneuver in his memoirs stating, “It was unmistakably evident
that General Sheridan concurred in the universally accepted opinion that it was
impracticable for the Confederates to pass or march along the rugged and almost
perpendicular face of Massanutten Mountain and assail his left.”261 On the night of
October 18, Major General John B. Gordon’s division set out to utilize the fords along
the Union left and by the morning of October 19 was in position to strike. In addition to
Gordon’s elaborate flanking attempt, Early dispatched Major General Kershaw’s division
to cross Cedar Creek and strike Brigadier General George Crook’s Army of West
Virginia.262 Directly to the west of Kershaw’s attack Brigadier General Wharton was
instructed to move up the Valley Pike and engage the Union right. This formed a three
pronged attack that was designed to both surprise and envelope the Union camps.263
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264

Although Early’s
arly’s plan of attack was tactically sound, he had already made his first
major mistake by failing to recognize a basic need present amongst his troops. The
condition of Early’s Confederates had become increasingly poor as they lacked many
basic necessities
es such as shoes, adequate clothing, and various foodstuffs.265 Early’s plan
depended on his troops surprising the Federals in their camps and pushing them from
their position. This tactic would place the Confederate troops in close proximity to many
of thee goods they desperately needed and would be a tempting opportunity for them to
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slow or even halt their advance. Despite these circumstances, there is no evidence that
Early emphasized the importance of keeping his ranks together to his lieutenants and
various subordinates. This mistake would have reverberating effects throughout the rest
of the day.266
At 5 A.M. Early initiated his three-pronged attack with Gordon’s division
slamming into the unsuspecting camps of Crook’s Army of West Virginia. The presence
of Gordon’s troops on their side of the Shenandoah River shocked the Federals. Crook’s
troops immediately gave way to the charging southern line, which spurred Brigadier
General William Emory to reposition his XIX Corps to blunt Gordon’s assault.267 Early
remarked, “Gordon, however, pushed his attack with great energy, and the 19th and
Crook's corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces of artillery
and a considerable quantity of small arms, abandoned.”268 This realignment opened the
path for Gabriel Wharton’s division to march unimpeded up the Valley Pike and strike at
the fleeing Federals. By 6 A.M., the entire Union line was in disarray and collapsing as
the Confederate pincer movement worked entirely as planned.269 Even Grant admits to
the effectiveness of the Confederate attack when he said “On the 18th of October Early
was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our
left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing
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eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners.”270 Sheridan also
articulates the ferocity of the Confederate assault when he stated, “Kershaw opening the
fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon
struck Crook's extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with such
suddenness as to stampede Crook's men.”271
The Federals were in full retreat and giving up ground at an alarming rate as the
Confederate onslaught pushed Sheridan’s battered force toward Middletown. However,
initial Confederate success was soon eclipsed by the Confederate commander’s inability
to keep his force concentrated and on the attack. Early’s failure to prepare for his troops
looting the Federal camps resulted in a dilution of his divisions as they made their way
through the Union position, ripe with a bounty of clothing and food.272 Early recounted,
“As I passed across Cedar Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a
number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions was
ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their commands.” He went on to say, “It
was reported to me, subsequently, that a great number were at the same work, and I sent
all my staff officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the
division commanders to send for their men.”273 This clearly evidences that the
Confederates lost exponentially more troops as units were dispatched to retrieve those
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that had been broken ranks. Ultimately, the responsibility to manage the troops fell to the
commanding general and a strong argument can be made that Early failed by not
asserting the necessary control functions to manage his army.274
In addition to this grave tactical error, the attrition from the previous month’s
combat began to manifest itself as Confederate numerical deficiencies inhibited Early’s
ability to maintain his assault. The troops lost in the fighting from the previous two
months were sorely missed as the Confederate columns began to thin out over the mile
and a half since the attack began.275 The Federals continued to flee, but the effective
number of troops Early had on the front lines exponentially diminished as he pursued the
withdrawing northerners. Here the correlation between tactics and attrition became
evident, as Early perceived that he did not possess the necessary manpower to continue
his attack.276
By noon Early had reached the north end of town where he would make his next
and most critical mistake. Early feared his army had become overextended and ordered a
halt to his attack. In his memoirs, Early blamed attrition: “It was now apparent that it
would not do to press my troops further. They had been up all night and were much
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning, their own
ranks had become disordered, the men scattered, and it had required time to re-form
them. Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the advance of the men engaged in
plundering the enemy's camps.”277 Gordon commented on Early’s halt saying, “We
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halted, we hesitated, we dallied, firing a few shots here, attacking with a brigade or a
division there, and before such feeble assaults the superb Union corps retired at
intervals.278” This fatal error gave the Federals an invaluable opportunity to salvage what
had been a disastrous day. Prior to the battle, Sheridan had been approximately twenty
miles away in Winchester, Virginia. Upon hearing of the Confederate surprise attack, he
mounted his horse and raced toward Cedar Creek. He arrived to see his army disoriented
and fleeing the field. Although the Federals were in full retreat, Early’s army had halted
their pursuit giving Sheridan the necessary time to rally his shattered troops and organize
a counter attack.279 Sheridan’s presence on the battlefield had a resounding effect on his
men and by 4:00 P.M., they began to push Early’s diluted force south. Early had lost the
momentum and Sheridan capitalized on the results of Confederate attrition and tactical
mistakes by ordering a full-scale frontal assault on Early’s force.280
The Confederates, lacking the necessary concentration of troops to repulse the
attack, began to crumble under Sheridan’s assault and soon fell into a scattered retreat
back down the Valley Pike. The southerners fled to their old positions around Fisher’s
Hill and awaited a continuation of the Federal counterattack. Despite this expectation,
Sheridan halted his advance at Cedar Creek allowing Early to disengage and regroup
what was left of his shattered force. The following day the Confederates fled south
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toward New Market, and within the next week returned to Waynesboro.281
Following the devastating defeat at Cedar Creek, the majority of Early’s troops
returned to Petersburg to support Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate
defeat at Cedar Creek marked the end of Early’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley as
his force had been demolished and Union dominance firmly established in the region.282
The defeat at Cedar Creek was the culmination of gradually accumulating attrition and
faulty tactics that eventually caught up with Early’s force. Of the some 20,000
Confederates present at the battle, they suffered 3,000 casualties. The numerical value of
these Confederate losses is somewhat deceiving, as Early’s army had experienced a
defeat that severely scattered his force. The southern route dispersed the Confederate
army to the extent that Early was unable to reorganize what was left his force into a
cohesive fighting unit. In this sense the casualties represented the complete destruction
of the Confederate army in the Shenandoah. The Union, on the other hand, fielded over
31,000 troops and suffered no less than 5,500 killed, wounded and missing. Despite
Sheridan’s seemingly heavy losses, he managed to effectively marshal his resources so as
to ensure the permanent destruction of Early’s army.283
Lee ordered what remained of Early’s army to return to Petersburg leaving the
Shenandoah open to the Federals. For the remainder of October and throughout the
winter of 1864, Sheridan’s army operated with impunity throughout the region destroying
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whatever they deemed necessary. Even with the return of the troops Lee had sent to the
Shenandoah Valley, he was ultimately unable to protect Petersburg and Richmond. By
April 1865, Lee capitulated and formally surrendered his army to Ulysses S. Grant, thus
concluding major military action in the region. Despite initial success in the Shenandoah
Valley, Early ultimately failed in his attempt to disrupt Union operations and
permanently tie up the Federal’s resources there. He was also unsuccessful in his bid to
protect the resources of the Shenandoah and, following his retreat south, the region
remained under Union control for the remainder of the war.
Sheridan’s 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley started off slow yielding
little progress against Early’s army. Clashes such as the Battle of Berryville left both
Union and Confederate commanders unsatisfied as they both sought a decisive battle with
definitive results. Early’s raid north gave Sheridan the opportunity he needed to strike
the Confederate force and gain a decisive victory. Early attempted to defend his
columns, but was eventually overrun and routed. The Confederate retreat was halted
when Early selected a few bluffs at Fisher’s Hill as his best opportunity to turn and fight
the Federal pursuers. Despite Early’s attempt to defend this position Confederate losses
from previous days and tactical mistakes resulted in yet another Confederate defeat.
Following the stunning Federal victory at Fisher’s Hill, Early retreated south to
Waynesboro where he sought to reorganize his defeated army. After a few weeks in the
southern Shenandoah Valley, the Confederates once again moved north to engage and
defeat Sheridan’s numerically superior force. Early maneuvered his army to Strasburg,
Virginia where he staged a daring surprise attack on the Federal army encamped near
Cedar Creek. The Confederate surprise attack started off quite well and shocked the
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Federals but tactical errors and attrition began to inhibit the southern advance.
Eventually the Confederate advance stalled and Sheridan was able to mount a successful
counter attack, which shattered Early’s army. Following the action at Cedar Creek,
Early’s army in the Shenandoah Valley ceased to exist, thus concluding the Sheridan’s
1864 Valley Campaign. Following Early’s absolute failure in the Shenandoah Valley
Lee was forced to relieve Early of his command as both the military and civilian
population had lost faith in his ability to command an independent army. The ever tactful
Lee wrote to Early “While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion to the
cause is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the
current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the service. I
therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander who would be more likely to
develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the soldiers with
confidence.”284 This marked the end of Early’s military career and the beginning of his
role as an iconic unreconstructed analyst of the war and other’s mistakes.
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Conclusion
The Shenandoah Valley was the backdrop for a tremendous military action
throughout the course of the war. The region saw elaborate military campaigns along
with a multitude of smaller clashes and partisan activity. Starting as early as 1862 the
Valley was the site of full scale military operations where figures like Thomas
“Stonewall” Jackson gained worldwide recognition for their exploits and tactical acumen.
Both the Union and the Confederacy quickly recognized that the Valley represented an
important military objective and devoted significant resources to the region for the
remainder of the war.
By mid-1864 Ulysses S. Grant held supreme control of the Union military and
rapidly implemented a grand strategy that would devote specific attention to the
Shenandoah Valley. The region had been used to orchestrate Confederate forays into the
North along with being a source of food production for Lee’s army defending Richmond.
Additionally, the Shenandoah provided an excellent avenue of advance toward the vitally
important railroad hubs around Lynchburg, which were essential to the Confederate
defense of Richmond These factors, made the region an even greater military target for
the Union. Furthermore, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia quickly found
themselves in an increasingly desperate siege around Richmond and Lee sought to dilute
Grant’s besieging force by opening a new front in the Shenandoah, thus necessitating a
realignment of Federal armies.
The first 1864 campaign in the Valley went relatively well for the Confederates as
they won a stunning victory at New Market by marshaling all available resources and
limiting casualties. Furthermore, they employed sound tactics which resulted in an
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embarrassing Union defeat. The subsequent battles at Piedmont and Lynchburg further
accentuated the distinct correlation between attrition and tactics as is evidenced by their
outcomes. Early’s campaign in the northern portion of the Shenandoah and his victory at
Monocacy stand as excellent examples of how tactics can be utilized to prevent
casualties. Additionally, they expose how low attrition paired with sound battlefield
judgment is a winning combination. The action at Washington D.C. and the following
Confederate withdrawal are all excellent examples of what can be accomplished when
tactics are focused to prevent attrition. Sheridan’s Valley Campaign further demonstrates
the relationship between battlefield decisions and attrition as he mobilized his force to
shatter Early’s army at Winchester and then exploited Confederate attrition for a second
victory at Fisher’s Hill. The culminating battle in the Shenandoah Valley at Cedar Creek
is an excellent example of the profound relationship between attrition and tactics as it is
clear that initial Confederate success was due to the relatively low losses they suffered.
Furthermore, the following fatal halt and eventual Confederate route was a direct result of
poor tactics paired with heavy losses.
Given the evidence provided within this research, there most certainly exists an
inextricable correlation between tactics and attrition. It is also clear that attrition affected
the 1864 Valley Campaigns as casualties and troops unavailable for combat dramatically
altered the tactics utilized. The relationship between these two factors consistently
effected results on the battlefield and the eventual fate of the Valley. The outcome of
such a sweeping campaign cannot be linked exclusively to these two factors; however,
they do contribute to the overall understanding of the conflict.
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It is the hope of this research to redirect the analysis of these Valley Campaigns to
incorporate a serious appraisal of tactics and attrition. Any understanding of the outcome
of these campaigns cannot be derived without a firm grasp of the relationship between
these two factors. In many regards, attrition and casualties dominated the decisions of
both sides and it is clear that whoever could best manage these variables drastically
increased their chances of success. However, by the summer of 1865, the war was over
and the inhabitants of the Shenandoah Valley enjoyed a return to normalcy. The damage
from Sheridan’s raids and the bloody battles of the previous years gradually healed and
gave way to a new chapter in American history. The hallowed ground that was the site of
so much bloodshed returned to farmland, and there was once again peace in the Valley.
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